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CYBER DUE DILIGENCE
ERIC TALBOT JENSEN* & SEAN WATTS**
Abstract
Due diligence—the notion that international law includes a duty to cease
and remedy damage that emanates from a State’s territory—has been
proposed as an international legal measure to temper destabilizing effects
of harm from cyber infrastructure. Yet the extent to which States,
particularly the United States, accept due diligence as either a principle of
general international law or as a rule of conduct applicable to the context
of cyberspace is not clear. This Article examines past and present U.S.
experience with due diligence, both as a principle and rule of conduct in
general international law. In light of U.S. foreign relations history, a trend
toward acceptance among allies and partners, and clear utility to State
relations in cyberspace, we argue for renewed acceptance by the United
States of the general principle of due diligence and its specific application
to cyber operations.
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I. Introduction
At present, it is difficult to characterize the United States as an enthusiast
of either international dispute resolution or broad international legal limits
on State behavior, such as the duty of due diligence—the notion that
international law includes a duty to cease and remedy damage that
emanates from a State’s territory. Yet on two occasions the United States
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has been the beneficiary of favorable and momentous international arbitral
awards on due diligence grounds. First, in the aftermath of the Civil War,
an arbitral tribunal awarded the United States a significant recovery for
damages from British failure of diligence with respect to armed ships
provided to the Confederacy.1 Second, in the first half of the twentieth
century, the United States successfully resorted to the due diligence
principle to secure damages from Canada for transboundary pollution from
a privately owned iron and zinc smelter near their border.2 Each of these
U.S.-initiated due diligence claims inspired increasing acceptance of the
doctrine by the larger international legal community.
Despite past diplomatic embrace and successful results with due
diligence, current U.S. legal policy toward the principle is uncertain. After
extensive research, including direct questioning, a Rapporteur recently
concluded,
[P]rior public U.S. statements have not addressed the
international legal status of due diligence directly. It is notable,
however, that the United States has tended to describe any
obligations to respond to requests for assistance in non-binding
terms. The lack of any public U.S. endorsement of due diligence
as a legal rule . . . may be indicative of U.S. doubts as to its legal
status.3
Still, general trends in international law support due diligence.
Judgments by the International Court of Justice, 4 a decision of the United
States Supreme Court,5 recent studies by the International Law
Association, 6 and draft articles prepared by the United Nations International
Law Commission7 have embraced due diligence as a general principle of
international law. The same bodies have also recognized sector-specific

1. See infra Section II.A.
2. See infra Section II.B.
3. DUNCAN B. HOLLIS, IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE
CYBER OPERATIONS: FOURTH REPORT 21 (2020).
4. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
5. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887).
6. See DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, INT’ L LAW ASS’N, STUDY GROUP ON DUE
DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FIRST REPORT 1 (2014) [hereinafter ILA 2014 REPORT ];
DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, INT’L LAW ASS’N, STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECOND REPORT 1 (2016) [hereinafter ILA 2016 REPORT ].
7. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its FiftyThird Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 153 (2001).
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refinements to the doctrine in the form of detailed obligations and duties
relating to State due diligence.
Meanwhile, due diligence has emerged as an increasingly prominent
international legal proposal to temper highly destabilizing effects of harm
from States’ territorial cyber infrastructure. 8 Due diligence enthusiasts have
advocated not mere application of the principle as a matter of default or
general international law; they have proposed adoption of cyber-specific
notions of due diligence that incorporate refinements derived from other
sector-specific schemes of due diligence, such as those applicable to
neutrality, armed conflict, the natural environment, the high seas, and even
municipal law. Still, States, including the United States, seem hesitant to
apply the principle to cyber activities or to incorporate wholesale the
doctrinal nuances of regime-specific notions of due diligence. In recent
cyber statements, the United States failed to adopt (or in most cases even
mention) the application of due diligence to cyber activities. 9
This Article considers these past and present international legal policies
with a view toward future U.S. approaches to international law due
diligence. We begin with detailed accounts of the Alabama and Trail
Smelter arbitrations, identifying key legal determinations made by the
tribunals and, perhaps more significantly, by the parties themselves. We
then outline the present state of the international law of due diligence,
illustrating the lasting influence of the arbitrations while emphasizing the
dual incarnations of due diligence as both a principle and as a sectorspecific rule. We then examine due diligence as applied to emerging cyber
activities, identifying simultaneously a trend toward general acceptance of
baseline due diligence and a host of doctrinal ambiguities ripe for resolution
by States. We encourage the United States to reclaim its place as an
advocate of general due diligence and to develop and publicize a policy
toward a cyber-specific doctrine of international law due diligence.

8. David Drissel, Cyberspatial Transformations of Society: Applying Durkheimian and
Weberian Perspectives to the Internet, 8 INT’L J. TECH., KNOWLEDGE & SOC’Y 71, 78, 81
(2012) (describing destabilizing transformations of international society from cyber
activities of States and non-State actors).
9. See, e.g., Rodney Hunter, Pol. Coordinator, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Remarks at a
UN Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting on Cyber Attacks Against Critical
Infrastructure (Aug. 26, 2020), https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-councilarria-formula-meeting-on-cyber-attacks-against-critical-infrastructure-via-vtc/ (stating that
the United States commits to “upholding the stability of cyberspace” without mentioning or
alluding to due diligence).
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II. Past Perspectives
A. The Alabama Claims
On May 13, 1861, just after its forces fired the opening salvoes of the
American Civil War, the Southern Confederacy authorized letters of
marque and reprisal for maritime privateers to attack and seize Union
shipping.10 The same day, the British government controversially
recognized the Confederates as a belligerency and declared neutrality in the
conflict.11 After the British declaration, Confederate naval agents set out to
commission ships from Great Britain and France to attack Union shipping
and to challenge the North’s blockade of Southern ports.12 Confederate
agents soon managed to commission ships from several British builders
eager to cash in on the conflict.
To dodge Great Britain’s international obligations as a neutral State,
private British shipyards disguised the delivery destinations and the warlike
character of the Confederate-commissioned ships.13 The shipbuilders gave
10. THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE
STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE INSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT, FEBRUARY 8, 1861, TO ITS
TERMINATION, FEBRUARY 18, 1862, INCLUSIVE 100 (James M. Matthews ed., 1864),
https://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/19conf/19conf.html#p100 (authorizing the Confederate
President “to issue to private armed vessels commissions, or letters of marque and general
reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, under the seal of the Confederate States,
against the vessels, goods and effects of the government of the United States”).
11. BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1860–1861, at 165–69 (London, William
Ridgway 1868); see also MOUNTAGUE BERNARD, A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE
NEUTRALITY OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 135–36 (London,
Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 1870) (reproducing the Queen’s neutrality proclamation
in full). Classically, declarations of belligerency by States amounted to recognition that
rebels or insurrectionists conducting hostilities had achieved a level of organization,
violence, and control sufficient to warrant application of the international legal rights and
obligations governing armed conflict between States. See Valentina Azarova & Ido Blum,
Belligerency, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INT’L LAW ¶¶ 1, 2, https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e249?rskey=Hul7F2&result=
1&prd=MPIL# (last updated Sept. 2015) (via subscription).
12. Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1, 3–4
(2005) (citing JAMES D. BULLOCH, THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES IN
EUROPE : OR, HOW THE CONFEDERATE CRUISERS WERE EQUIPPED 410 (London, Richard
Bentley 1883)).
13. All told, Britain converted five merchant ships to Confederate warships and built
three warships specifically for the Confederate navy. See JP van Niekerk, The Story of the
CSS (“Daar kom die ...”) Alabama: Some Legal Aspects of Her Visit to the Cape of Good
Hope, and Her Influence on the Historical Development of the Law of War and Neutrality,
International Arbitration, Salvage, and Maritime Prize, 13 FUNDAMINA 175, 177 (2007). In
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the hulls generic numerical designations or misleading foreign pseudonyms
while under construction. 14 They then launched the ships unarmed and
sailed them under British colors, sending their weapons and munitions
separately to overseas ports for final delivery to the Confederates. 15
Aware of these schemes and anxious to compel Great Britain to seize the
ships, the U.S. Consul in Liverpool hired private investigators to collect
evidence to confront the British government. 16 The investigators easily
detected and reported the military character of several vessels under
construction to the U.S. Consul. 17 Vigorous American protests and
communications to the British Foreign Minister persuaded Great Britain to
seize two ironclad steamships bound for the Confederate navy. 18 Still,
Nassau, Bahamas, where she was to be fitted with guns, a British Navy Captain ordered the
Oreto (later renamed Florida) seized prior to delivery assessing her a warship unsuited to
merchant service. Bingham, supra note 12, at 5. However, an admiralty judge in Nassau
overturned the order, deeming British domestic law lacking authority for the seizure. See id.
The Enrica, later renamed Alabama, evaded a long-delayed and belatedly issued detention
order from the Queen’s Advocate, meeting her armaments and ammunition in the Azores.
See id. at 6.
14. van Niekerk, supra note 13, at 186. The Alabama reportedly launched from its
shipyard with “a large number of wives and well-wishers” to reinforce her disguise as a
merchant ship. Id.
15. JAMES TERTIUS DEKAY, THE REBEL RAIDERS: THE ASTONISHING HISTORY OF THE
CONFEDERACY’S SECRET NAVY 59, 71–76 (2002). A loophole in the British Foreign
Enlistment Act of 1819 permitted British shipbuilders to construct warships for foreign
powers at war without government consent, so long as arms were not fitted or furnished in
the crown’s jurisdiction. Bingham, supra note 12, at 9. In 1867, a Royal Commission
redrafted the law to close the loophole, taking effect in 1870. Id. at 10–11.
16. See Douglas H. Maynard, Union Efforts to Prevent the Escape of the Alabama, 41
MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 41, 42–43 (1954).
17. Id.; see also BERNARD, supra note 11, at 337–38.
18. The Alabama Claims, 1862-1872, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE : OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/alabama (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). Wary of
its prospects before Liverpool courts thought sympathetic to the Confederacy, rather than
litigate seizure of the ironclads, the British government purchased them for service in its
Navy. Bingham, supra note 12, at 8. A secretary to the Senior Counsel for the American side
in the arbitration recalled the United States “beheld in England, ‘the dockyard and arsenal of
the insurgents.’” FRANK WARREN HACKETT, REMINISCENCES OF THE GENEVA TRIBUNAL OF
ARBITRATION, 1872: THE ALABAMA CLAIMS 21 (1911); CALEB CUSHING, THE TREATY OF
WASHINGTON : ITS NEGOTIATION, EXECUTION, AND THE DISCUSSIONS RELATING THERETO 15
(New York, Harper & Brothers 1873) (noting the United States believed “Great Britain and
her Colonies had been the arsenal, the navy-yard, and the treasury of the Confederates”);
BERNARD, supra note 11, at 371–75 (reproducing letters between the American Consul,
Charles Adams, and British Foreign Minister, Lord Earl Russell, concerning imminent
launch of Confederate-commissioned ships).
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several ships built in British ports entered Confederate service during this
period, including a swift, screw-driven sloop designated “hull number 290,”
which the Confederates later renamed the C.S.A. Alabama.19 All told,
British-supplied ships, including most infamously the Alabama, sank more
than 150 U.S. merchant vessels around the world before their capture or
destruction.20
The sinkings generated enormous U.S. hostility toward Great Britain. At
one point, the United States alleged British support to the Confederates
“afforded to the United States just and ample cause of war.”21 Along with
British Government sympathy for the Confederacy throughout the war, the
losses to merchant shipping stoked U.S. resentment that extended well after
the Union’s victory in 1865.22 Still, on May 8, 1871, after years of intense
diplomatic negotiations, the United States and Great Britain signed the

19. See The Alabama Claims, 1862-1872, supra note 18; van Niekerk, supra note 13, at
186.
20. The Alabama Claims, 1862-1872, supra note 18. The Alabama operated globally
including off the coasts of Brazil, South Africa, Singapore, and Europe, sinking sixty-four
U.S. ships. Bingham, supra note 12, at 6–7; see also HACKETT, supra note 18, at 46 (stating,
while observing the effects of Confederate sea raids, “The commerce of the United States
was almost totally wiped out of existence.”). To elude the raids, American shipowners
reflagged 750 ships to foreign registry and merchants abandoned U.S. carriers for foreign
shipping in droves. ADRIAN COOK, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS: AMERICAN POLITICS AND ANGLOAMERICAN RELATIONS, 1865-1872, at 15 (1975).
21. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 16. Having served as a General in the U.S. Army during
the Mexican American War, Cushing was U.S. Counsel at the Alabama arbitral tribunal.
Cushing, Caleb: 1800-1879, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., https://bioguide.
congress.gov/search/bio/C001016 (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
22. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 46–47 (noting a threat of impending war arising from
the claims); CUSHING, supra note 18, at 15 (describing an “intense feeling of indignation
against Great Britain” in the United States); BERNARD, supra note 11, at 493–94 n.1
(confirming a persistent sense of injury in the United States toward Great Britain even five
years after the war). In a notorious speech delivered in Newcastle, Prime Minister Gladstone
argued, “We may have our own opinions about slavery; we may be for or against the South;
but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an Army.
They are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either—they
have made a nation.” 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 41 (Wash., Gov’t
Printing Off. 1872) [hereinafter TREATY OF WASHINGTON PAPERS]. After the war, Gladstone
apologized for the remarks as “an undoubted error, the most singular and palpable, I may
add the least excusable, of them all.” HACKETT, supra note 18, at 24. A Secretary to the
American delegation recorded “both capitals believed [the arbitration] might even decide a
question of peace or war.” Id. at 235. But see COOK, supra note 20, at 245 (estimating no
real danger of war erupting from the Alabama claims).
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Treaty of Washington. 23 The Treaty created, inter alia, an international
arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute in what became known as the
Alabama claims.24
The first article of the Treaty of Washington did not bode well for British
success. The Treaty opened with an admission of British fault, expressing
“regret felt by Her Majesty’s Government for the escape . . . of the
Alabama and other vessels from British ports.”25 It then codified the
arbitrators’ rules for decision, also highly unfavorable to the British side. 26
The rules provided, in relevant part:
A neutral government is bound—
First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or
equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on
war against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use
like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of
any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such
vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within
such jurisdiction, to warlike use.
....
23. The Treaty of Washington was a treaty between Great Britain and the United States
for the “amicable settlement of all causes of difference between the two countries.” Treaty of
Washington, Gr. Brit.-U.S., pmbl., May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863 [hereinafter 1871 Treaty of
Washington]. Both sides ratified the treaty immediately, and it entered force on June 17,
1871. Id. at 863. The treaty marked the conclusion of several rounds of failed negotiations.
CUSHING, supra note 18, at 10.
24. 1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 23, 17 Stat. at 864. The tribunal consisted of
five members including one from each of the parties to the treaty. Id. Italy, Switzerland, and
Brazil supplied the remaining arbitrators. Id.
25. Id. A report of the diplomatic commission that produced the Washington Treaty
indicates the British expression of regret was received “as very satisfactory to them as a
token of kindness.” HACKETT, supra note 18, at 67 n.1; see also CUSHING, supra note 18, at
20 (indicating that the British Commissioners’ concession of regret stemmed from a friendly
spirit); J.C. BANCROFT DAVIS, MR. FISH AND THE ALABAMA CLAIMS: A CHAPTER IN
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 148–58 (Boston & New York, Houghton, Mifflin, & Co. 1893)
(reproducing the Protocol of Conference Between the High Commissioners on the Part of
the United States of America and the High Commissioners on the Part of Great Britain, May
4, 1871).
26. Some attribute the rules article of the treaty to the highly uncertain state of the
relevant international law, including the law of neutrality. Elizabeth Chadwick, The British
View of Neutrality in 1872, in NOTIONS OF NEUTRALITIES 87, 87–88 (Pascal Lottaz &
Herbert R. Reginbogin eds., 2019).
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Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters,
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any
violation of the foregoing obligations and duties. 27
A curious caveat accompanied the Treaty’s rules clause. This stipulation
indicated the British side did not regard the rules as “a statement of
principles of international law which were in force at the time when the
claims . . . arose.”28 Although seemingly contrary to the letter and sentiment
of the Treaty of Washington, this savings clause resolved a persistent point
of disagreement, reportedly rescuing the Treaty’s prospects for
ratification.29 During negotiations, U.S. diplomatic representatives had
insisted the Treaty’s rules—including the duty of due diligence—reflected
general international law applicable at the time of the delivery of the
ships. 30 British negotiators ardently resisted, insisting the parties
memorialize narrower, ad hoc legal grounds for the tribunal to resolve the
dispute. The British preferred the tribunal avoid the question of general
international legal duties, including due diligence. They insisted that
existing custom and usage included no international legal obligation with
respect to outfitting and equipping unarmed ships by a neutral State. 31
In fact, the Treaty of Washington reference to due diligence was not at
all unprecedented in international law. For that matter, it was not even
unprecedented in relations between the United States and Great Britain. In
the 1794 Jay Treaty, the United States agreed to refer to a mixed claims
commission demands arising from British subjects’ loss of vessels and
cargo at the hands of private ships armed in neutral U.S. ports during Great
27. 1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 23, 17 Stat. at 865.
28. Id. During negotiation of the treaty, a description of the international law principles
applicable during the war divided the parties deeply. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY
540–44 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1898) [hereinafter MOORE 1898].
29. Protocol of Conference Between the High Commissioners on the Part of the United
States of America and the High Commissioners on the Part of Great Britain (May 4, 1871),
in DAVIS, supra note 25, at 153–55 [hereinafter Protocol of Conference]. This protocol reads
as a legislative history or travaux préparatoires of the Treaty of Washington Conference.
See id.
30. Argument of Mr. Evarts, One of the Counsel of the United States, Addressed to the
Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, on the 5th and 6th August 1872, in Reply to the Special
Argument of the Counsel of Her Britannic Majesty, in SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON
GAZETTE : OCTOBER 4, 1872, at 4638, 4640 (London, Authority of Her Majesty 1872)
[hereinafter Argument of Mr. Evarts] (arguing the due diligence standard was “wholly [an]
international obligation antecedent to [the] agreement”).
31. Id.
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Britain’s war with France. 32 And in 1837, during a rebellion in Canada,
insurgents hired a U.S.-flagged steamer, the Caroline, to ferry supplies
across the Niagara River into Canada.33 The U.S. government had
maintained a neutral approach toward the rebellion. 34 After complaints of
U.S. failure to stem the flow of supplies to the insurgents, Great Britain
took matters into its own hands and destroyed the Caroline.35
The incident generated vigorous, and now well-known, legal and
diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Great Britain. 36
Although most often regarded as an exposition on the right of self-defense
between States, the Caroline correspondence is also instructive as to due
diligence.37 In fact, the Caroline incident reflects more closely a failure of
due diligence than a case of attack giving rise to self-defense in light of the
fact that logistical support to the Canadian rebels was not attributed to the
United States but rather constituted private acts. In their resolution of the
Caroline dispute, the parties agreed, “[A]ll that can be expected from either
government in these cases is good faith, a sincere desire to preserve peace
and do justice, [and] the use of all proper means of prevention . . . .”38 Thus
at least with respect to these two episodes, the Treaty of Washington
represented an extension, rather than innovation, of notions of due diligence
owed between States.
32. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Britannic Majesty-U.S.,
art. VII, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 998–99 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1906) [hereinafter MOORE 1906]. Moore
asserts the Jay Treaty arrangement served as an example to the later Alabama arbitration. Id.
at 999.
33. KENNETH R. STEVENS, BORDER DIPLOMACY : THE CAROLINE AND MCLEOD AFFAIRS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1837-1842, at 12 (1989).
34. Id.
35. See MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at 919 (describing U.S. Secretary of State
instructions to district attorneys in Northern states to abstain from involvement in the
rebellion); see also MAURICE G. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE : DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE
UNION 321 (1984) (explaining President Van Buren’s strict policy of neutrality in the
rebellion, even after the Caroline was destroyed).
36. Matthew Waxman, The ‘Caroline’ Affair in the Evolving International Law of SelfDefense, LAWFARE (Aug. 28, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/caroline-affair
(relating historical details of the destruction of the Caroline and diplomatic and legal
correspondence that followed).
37. Chadwick, supra note 26, at 92–94.
38. Id. at 93 (emphasis added). In response to the incident, the United States amended
its domestic neutrality laws to better authorize federal interventions and seizures. See id.
(citing Act of Mar. 10, 1838, ch. 31, 5 Stat. 212); see also MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at
920 (describing events leading to amendment of U.S. neutrality laws).
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At the Alabama arbitration, Great Britain ultimately agreed to the U.S.proposed rules, including the recitation of due diligence. The British side
conceded, evidently, “to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly
relations between the two countries.”39 More importantly in terms of legal
legacy, the Treaty of Washington’s due diligence obligation was not merely
an ad hoc rule of decision. The States understood the rule, on the face of the
treaty, to have a prospective and potentially multilateral effect as well. They
explicitly agreed the rules of Article VI would govern their future relations
and invited other maritime powers to accede to them. 40
With the Treaty in place, the Alabama arbitral tribunal met in Geneva in
a room of the Hôtel de Ville that has since been preserved as a shrine of
sorts to international law.41 Each side submitted a lengthy printed brief of
its case and respective counter-case.42 Yet the most significant exchanges of
views on due diligence actually took place later during a second merits
stage of the arbitration. The supplemental session was arranged through
persistent British maneuvering but facilitated in large part by Alexander
Cockburn, the British member of the tribunal. 43 In this supplemental
session, the tribunal agreed to hear arguments “on the question of ‘due
diligence generally considered.’”44
The British side immediately seized the added session as an opportunity
to backpedal its commitment to the Treaty of Washington. The British
advocates contended international law, as it stood at the time of the
American Civil War, did not prohibit State conduct “in which no active
interference in war is imputed to a neutral State.” 45 A lengthy British

39. Protocol of Conference, supra note 29, at 155.
40. 1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 23, 17 Stat. at 865–66.
41. Hall of the Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1924, at 15 (describing the preserved
room of arbitration). The same room had recently hosted the Society for the Succor of the
Wounded related to the Red Cross movement. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 76–77.
42. The U.S. case runs to 5,442 pages, and the British case to 2,823 pages as reprinted
by the U.S. Printing Office. See 1-6 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON—
GENEVA ARBITRATION (Wash., Gov’t Printing Off. 1872).
43. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 102–06, 111–13, 117–18, 121–23.
44. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 266–70, 292–93. Hackett was a secretary to Caleb
Cushing, the senior U.S. counsel at the arbitration. Id. at vii. He estimates the British counsel
had assumed their government would thwart the proceedings at an earlier stage. Id. at 266.
When their government did not, they mustered only summary arguments which their
member of the tribunal later arranged for them to augment in this supplementary stage. Id. at
270.
45. Argument of Her Britannic Majesty’s Counsel on the Points Mentioned in the
Resolution of the Arbitrators of July 25, 1872, in SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE :
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supplemental brief argued neither the law of neutrality nor international
principles of law recognized a duty of diligence in the form of omission. 46
Instead, to constitute breaches of due diligence and neutrality, “some act
must have been done by, or in aid of a belligerent, for the purposes of the
war.”47 Turning to the facts of the arbitration, Great Britain’s advocates
emphasized that each ship involved in the dispute left British territory
unarmed and in this respect was no different than other peaceful
commercial trade by neutrals.48
The British arguments faced a difficult passage from an influential
international law treatise by former Britannic Majesty’s Advocate Robert
Phillimore. Writing in 1871, just one year before the arbitrators met,
Phillimore offered strong support for an international duty of due diligence
between States. He observed, “[a] Government may by knowledge and
sufferance, as well as by direct permission, become responsible for the acts
of subjects whom it does not prevent from the commission of an injury to a
foreign State.”49 When considering a neutral States’ duties in the delivery of
ships, Phillimore carefully distinguished the character of specific
obligations of conduct with respect to arms and munitions from general
duties with respect to due diligence. 50 Still, nothing in Phillimore’s treatise
or reasoning significantly undermined his preceding observation that a
general obligation of due diligence attached, even with respect to omissions
by States. Acknowledging the relatively recent vintage of due diligence,
and perhaps with the Treaty of Washington in mind, Phillimore reminded
readers, “International Law is not stationary . . . [and] precedents of
history . . . cannot be considered as decisive on the point at issue.”51
The British advocates’ account of Phillimore first lodged a descriptive
rebuttal. They characterized his treatise as legally prospective in nature—an
observation by a publicist not assumed, even by its author, to bind

OCTOBER 4, 1872, at 4595 (London, Authority of Her Majesty 1872) [hereinafter Majesty’s
Counsel Argument].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 4596.
49. ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW xxi (Dublin,
Hodges, Foster, & Co., 2d ed. 1871). Elaborating later, however, Phillimore explained that
sales of contraband goods in a State’s own territory and even their delivery are consistent
with neutrality. Id. at xxiii (citing The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 340
(1822)).
50. Id. at xxiii.
51. Id. at xxvii–xxviii.
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sovereign States.52 Second, the British argued that Phillimore’s thoughts on
“knowledge and sufferance” were, by the usage of States, limited to the
context of “hostile expeditions” into foreign territory. 53 The British side
argued that omissions by States concerning the construction and sale of
unarmed ships of war by private shipbuilders were not included by State
practice within Phillimore’s notion of breaches of due diligence. 54
Concluding, and perhaps in anticipation of losing on the question of due
diligence generally, the British advocates emphasized that failure to prevent
harm did not in every case amount to a failure of due diligence. 55 A duty of
diligence is owed to a foreign government only when “timely information
and evidence of a legal kind” gives rise to a “reasonable ground of belief”
that harm would result.56 With respect to the Confederate ships, the brief
argued, no such duty arose nor was any such duty breached. 57
Predictably, the American reply moved past the question whether due
diligence reflected a principle of international law, relying squarely on its
incorporation into the Treaty of Washington by the parties. 58 The Treaty,
they insisted, definitively settled any debate on due diligence “as the law of
this Tribunal.”59 The United States reemphasized that the Treaty stated the
obligation clearly, requiring no interpretation by the tribunal, but merely
application to the facts of the arbitration. 60 Accordingly, the Americans
directed the tribunal’s attention to “whether the required due diligence [had]
been applied in the actual conduct of affairs by Great Britain.” 61
Like the Treaty of Washington and Phillimore’s treatise, U.S. arguments
incorporated requirements of reasonableness and awareness or
knowledge. 62 The American advocates insisted a “‘reasonable ground’ . . .
is an element of the question of due diligence always fairly to be
52. Majesty’s Counsel Argument, supra note 45, at 4599.
53. Id. at 4600.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 4623.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Argument of Mr. Evarts, supra note 30, at 4638–39.
59. Id. at 4639.
60. Id. at 4641–42. The British brief on due diligence had invoked the Swiss jurist Emer
de Vattel’s canons of treaty interpretation to the exclusion, the American brief noted, of his
most important, “it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation.” Id. at
4641 (quoting without citation EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. II, ch. XVII, §
263 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 2008) (1758)).
61. Id. at 4639.
62. Id. at 4643.
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considered” in judging the conduct of States and the extent of their
knowledge of harm emanating from their territory. 63 With respect to the
case of the British-supplied ships, the United States concluded,
It is made the clear and absolute duty of a nation to use due
diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any
vessel intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power with
which it is at peace, such vessel having been specially adapted in
whole or in part within such jurisdiction to warlike use. 64
One month later, the arbitrators held that Great Britain had violated its
duty of diligence as a neutral State by a unanimous decision as to the
Alabama and a four-to-one decision as to the C.S.A. Florida, another
British-built Confederate cruiser.65 The tribunal based its legal conclusions
on the Treaty of Washington but also cited “principles of international
law.”66 Importantly, the tribunal did not attribute construction or transfer of
the ships to the British government as acts of State. 67 However, it found
Great Britain had “failed, by omission, to fulfil the duties” of a neutral
State.68 By permitting the Alabama and other ships to launch, to the serious
detriment of the United States, Britain failed to exercise the duty of
diligence owed to a belligerent State by a neutral power. 69 Specifically, the
tribunal observed, Great Britain failed to take “effective measures of
prevention” regarding the ships’ deployment and later wrongfully admitted
these ships to its colonial ports.70 The tribunal awarded the United States
$15.5 million for its claims related to direct damage caused by the ships.71
Although frequently regarded as a ruling on the obligations of neutral
States during armed conflict, the Alabama arbitration also presents an early
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4644.
65. Alabama Claims of the United States of America Against Great Britain (Gr. Brit. v.
U.S.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 130–31 (Treaty of Wash. Arb. Trib. 1872).
66. Id. at 132.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 131.
69. See id. at 130–31.
70. Id. at 130.
71. Id. at 134. Though small in present terms, at the time of the arbitration the award
amounted to nearly five percent of the British overall budget. Bingham, supra note 12, at 1.
However, the tribunal rejected U.S. claims for costs incurred pursuing the ships, classifying
them as “general expenses of the war” rather than compensable damages. Similarly, it
rejected other indirect, or as the United States had termed them, “national” expenses such as
lost prospective earnings due to their contingent and uncertain nature. Alabama Claims of
the United States of America Against Great Britain, 29 R.I.A.A. at 133.
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picture of States’ general international obligations with respect to due
diligence. Guided by the parties’ own consensus statements of law codified
in a treaty, the tribunal clearly framed British conduct as both a breach of
its duty of due diligence to safeguard a State against harm emanating from
its territory as well as a failing of neutrality. In a qualitative sense, the
tribunal affirmed due diligence as a primary rule of conduct in international
law. The tribunal found States owed to one another a free-standing
obligation of due diligence that accompanied supporting legal duties in the
then-burgeoning international legal system. The British duty of diligence
arose both with respect to the free-standing obligations of Great Britain as a
neutral State as well as under an independent and general duty of diligence
to other sovereigns.
To be sure, the tribunal left aspects of the due diligence obligation
underdeveloped. It is unclear, for instance, whether the parties or tribunal
would have detected or applied a generalized or free-standing obligation of
due diligence with respect to harm that did not involve extensive physical
destruction and massive economic loss. But a baseline obligation of due
diligence, as a matter of general international law, was clear from both the
Treaty of Washington and the tribunal’s decision. Moreover, rather than a
failing or oversight, the tribunal’s decision not to develop or detect the
lower end of a damage spectrum seems entirely appropriate in light of its
limited adjudicative rather than legislative function. 72
The motives behind the parties’ legal positions during the dispute remain
uncertain, particularly on the British side. The Treaty of Washington bears
evidence of a certain legal magnanimity on the part of Great Britain.
Perhaps under the facts, but almost certainly according to the law described
in the Treaty, Great Britain was likely to lose the arbitration all along. 73
Chief Justice Bingham observed the arbitration was, “one of the very few
instances in history when the world’s leading nation, in the plenitude of its
power, has agreed to submit an issue of great national moment to the
decision of a body in which it could be, as it was, heavily outvoted.” 74
72. See Alabama Claims of the United States of America Against Great Britain, 29
R.I.A.A. at 128–29.
73. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 44 (quoting 2 EDMOND FITZMAURICE, THE LIFE OF
GRANVILLE GEORGE LEVESON GOWER SECOND EARL GRANVILLE 107 (New York, Longmans,
Green, & Co. 1906)). Fitzmaurice observed, “A proud nation . . . consented but unwillingly
to be dragged before an international tribunal without precedent in the history of nations, and
under circumstance in which, on the main issue at least, the judgment was certain to be
adverse.” FITZMAURICE, supra, at 107.
74. Bingham, supra note 12, at 24.
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Prime Minister Gladstone confirmed as much, characterizing the British
loss in the arbitration “‘as dust in the balance compared with the moral
example set’ of two proud nations going ‘in peace and concord before a
judicial tribunal’ rather than ‘resorting to the arbitrament of the sword.’”75
Personalities, as ever, surely influenced the peaceful resolution of the
Alabama claims as well. Reflecting later, Caleb Cushing, the U.S. Counsel
at the arbitration, observed that replacement of the unfailingly recalcitrant
Lord Russell by the more conciliatory Lord Stanley as British Minister of
Foreign Affairs, as much as any factor, explained the successful negotiation
and ratification of the Treaty of Washington. 76 Frank Hackett, a legal
advisor to Cushing, praised the eventual British embrace of a “more
generous sense of international duty.” 77
On the American side, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner had
secured defeat in the U.S. Senate of a draft treaty on the Alabama claims,
which was named the Clarendon-Johnson Treaty.78 His campaign against
U.S. concessions, which included a fiery and widely published speech
intended to stoke U.S. anger over the situation, significantly irritated Great
Britain, served as a compelling demonstration of American resolve, and
likely informed British concessions as well. 79
British legislative records also suggest a strategic motive for the British
allowances, related to brewing turmoil in Europe. Concern for renewed war
with Russia over Black Sea claims grew in light of France’s defeat at the
hands of Prussia in 1871.80 A communication to the House of Lords
explained the British decision to dispatch the diplomatic delegation in 1871
to negotiate the Treaty of Washington “in view of the possibility of further
European complications, to look at the international relations of Great
Britain with foreign states from a new standpoint.”81 In late 1870, the First
Lord of the Admiralty, Hugh Childers, had advised the Foreign Secretary
Lord Granville, in light of potential war with Russia, “all cause of
difference with the United States should if possible be got out of the
way.”82
75. Id. (quoting RICHARD SHANNON, GLADSTONE : HEROIC MINISTER, 1865-1898, at 114
(1999)).
76. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 17–18.
77. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 376.
78. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 18, 39.
79. Id. at 18.
80. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 175–76.
81. Id. at 175 (quoting FITZMAURICE, supra note 73, at 81).
82. Id. at 176 n.1 (quoting 1 SPENCER CHILDERS, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE HUGH E. CHILDERS 173–74 (1901)).
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A later study of the arbitration suggests economic motives for the British
settlement as well. British financiers and banks had invested heavily in U.S.
industry, transport, natural resources, and agriculture. 83 Failure to peaceably
settle the Alabama claims would have wrought severe interruptions to
profitable trade and investments.84 Additionally, the possibility of U.S. debt
cancelations weighed heavily in British diplomatic calculations. 85 Although
the sums involved in the arbitration were staggering at the time, war over
the Alabama claims would not have proved economically efficient by any
measure.86 These British financial interests almost certainly informed the
government’s conciliatory instructions to its diplomatic delegation and the
seemingly altruistic international legal positions it conceded to secure the
Treaty.87
As vindication of British magnanimity (or grand strategy), the Treaty of
Washington and the Alabama arbitration soon earned high praise both for
their “enlightened statesmanship” toward peace as well as for their
expositions of States’ international legal duties. 88 The British statesman
Viscount John Morley considered the arbitration “the most notable victory
in the nineteenth century of the noble art of preventive diplomacy.” 89 Prior
to the Alabama claims, relations between the United States and Great
Britain had been at their lowest point since the War of 1812.90
Ill feelings had extended to popular sentiment in the United States as
well. The American jurist John Bassett Moore noted a “deep and pent-up
feeling of national injury [among] the mass of the people of the United
States.”91 The arbitration occasioned the end of nearly a century of
83. COOK, supra note 20, at 241.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Id. Cook estimates, however, that the United States, starved of foreign capital,
needed Great Britain in an economic sense and stood to suffer a greater investment loss in
case of war. Id. He estimates financial considerations hampered the American negotiators
more than their counterparts. Id.
88. MOORE 1898, supra note 28, at 652–53; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW
SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (1927) (noting the arbitration was
“the first instance of settling a dispute which raised high national feeling on both sides”).
89. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 376 (quoting 3 JOHN MORLEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM
EWERT GLADSTONE 413 (1903)).
90. MOORE 1898, supra note 28, at 495.
91. Bingham, supra note 12, at 2 (quoting MOORE 1898, supra note 28, at 495). An
inflammatory Anglophobic speech by the Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner whipped
up antagonism and advocated an outrageous escalation of reparation demands including
cession of Canada to the United States. CHARLES SUMNER, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS, SPEECH
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intermittent war between the U.S. and U.K. and the beginning of decades of
“close and successful Anglo-American cooperation.”92
Adulations aside, it is worth entertaining the argument by at least one
modern estimate that the Treaty of Washington and the Alabama decision
did not fulfill their lofty mandate as legal precedent.93 The Treaty and
arbitration certainly did not usher an international legal revolution of the
sort hoped for by international law and arbitral enthusiasts of the day. 94 The
critical assessment is likely accurate when considered from the perspective
of international arbitration as a pervasive means of peaceful settlement of
disputes between powerful States. The critique does not account, however,
for the extensive and enduring precedents set for due diligence specifically.
The parties’ commitment to due diligence as a standard for their future and
relations, as well as their call for the community of States to do similarly,
stands as a prominent portent of future resorts to due diligence as a means
of settling differences borne out in the work of States, publicists, and
courts.
The work of the Alabama tribunal quickly found significant support from
domestic courts and, later, international courts. In 1887, the U.S. Supreme
Court heard a challenge to a federal law prohibiting counterfeits of foreign
government-issued notes, bonds, and securities in United States v. Arjona.95
Although the defendant demurred on an indictment for possession of
engraved plates capable of producing bank notes of “the state of Bolivar. . .
[in] the United States of Columbia [sic],” he challenged the sufficiency of
the indictment, arguing inter alia, the statutes exceeded Congress’s power
to “define and punish . . . offences against the law of nations.”96 Upholding
the statute, the Court turned to de Vattel’s Law of Nations and easily found
support for both a specific international law prohibition on condoning or
tolerating counterfeiters as well as a general international law duty of
diligence to cease and redress harm to other States. 97 The Court observed,
HONOURABLE CHARLES SUMNER, DELIVERED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 19 (London, Savill, Edwards & Co. 1869). In the speech’s aftermath, an
American consul reported from London widespread fear of war with the United States. See
COOK, supra note 20, at 84 (citing Letter from Freeman H. Morse to William Pitt Fessenden,
May 17, 1869, in FESSENDEN PAPERS (1908)).
92. Bingham, supra note 12, at 1 (citing ROY JENKINS, GLADSTONE 359 (1995)).
93. COOK, supra note 20, at 244.
94. Id.
95. 120 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1887).
96. Id. at 482, 484; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
97. Arjona, 120 U.S. at 484 (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 108
(Joseph Chitty trans., 7th ed. 1849) (1760)).
OF THE
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“The law of nations requires every national government to use ‘due
diligence’ to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to
another nation with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof.” 98 A
breach of due diligence, the Court noted, “may not, perhaps, furnish
sufficient cause for war, but it would certainly give just ground of
complaint.”99
Although under altered nomenclature, other States also eagerly codified
notions of due diligence identified in the Alabama claims into early
twentieth century multilateral treaties. For example, as part of the 1907
Hague Peace Conference effort to convert burgeoning customs and usages
in the international law of conflict management to treaty form, States
addressed the law of maritime neutrality. 100 Conflicts including the
Spanish-American War, the Anglo-Boer War, and most immediately the
Russo-Japanese War, resurrected questions concerning the extent and
nature of duties of neutral States. 101 The rules of the Treaty of Washington
figured prominently in Hague Peace Conference debates on the subject. 102
Despite its earlier reticence, Great Britain fully reproduced the Treaty of
Washington’s due diligence rules in the draft rules it submitted to the
Conference. 103 Noting some “obscurity” associated with the phrase due
diligence, State delegates at The Hague substituted descriptive passages
indicating a neutral State is “bound to employ the means at its disposal” and
to “employ the same vigilance” in its international legal duties into the
treaty.104 But both the rule and spirit of due diligence described in the
Treaty of Washington and the Alabama decision were fully incorporated by
The Hague Conference’s work.105
Criticizing the Treaty of Washington and the Alabama arbitration as
inconsequential also disregards weighty acknowledgments of due diligence
as a principle and baseline rule of international law by publicists. Prominent
publicists soon confirmed the concept of due diligence as an aspect of
98. Id. at 484.
99. Id. at 487.
100. See generally A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES (1909).
101. See id. at 458.
102. See id. at 458–59. A questionnaire disseminated to the participating States and used
to survey States’ initial views included copies of the rules of the Treaty of Washington. Id.
103. See id. at 465.
104. See id. (citing M. Renault, Projet d’une Convention Concernant les Droits et les
Devoirs des Puissances Neutres en cas de Guerre Maritime, in 1 DEUXIÈME CONFÉRENCE
INTERNATIONALE DE LA PAIX 295, 302 (1907)); see also Convention Concerning the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War art. 8, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415.
105. See HIGGINS, supra note 100, at 387, 459, 464–65.
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general international law. In 1905, Professor John B. Moore’s survey of
State practice in international law offered firm support for the role of due
diligence between States to address transboundary harm. 106 He curated a
succession of communications from various U.S. State Department officials
reciting obligations of diligence owed by foreign States.107 A representative
U.S. communication asserted a State was liable, “not only for any injury
done by it, or with its permission . . . but for any such injury which by the
exercise of reasonable care it could have averted.”108
German jurist Lassa Oppenheim similarly acknowledged “international
delinquency,” including acts of “culpable negligence” resulting in injury to
another State, as a matter of general international law. 109 Addressing the
context of neutrality specifically, he concluded responsibility attached to a
neutral State for injury to a belligerent State “as he could by due diligence
have prevented, and which by culpable negligence he failed to prevent.” 110
Oppenheim quibbled with the precise formulation of duty articulated by the
Alabama tribunal. Although he surmised that the Alabama tribunal’s
formulation of the due diligence obligation was not part of the “universal
rules of International Law,” he based that rejection specifically on its
conclusion that due diligence involved weighing risks of injury to other
States and the cost of action by the neutral. 111 He ultimately concluded due
diligence was reflected in general international law principles but merely
required reasonable conduct in light of attending circumstances and
conditions.112
For his part, Hersch Lauterpacht, a judge on the International Court of
Justice, later characterized the Alabama tribunal’s notion of due diligence
as imported from private law concepts. But he strongly supported their
inclusion in general international law. 113 The Alabama parties’ arguments,
he noted, drew heavily on references to negligence in Roman and
106. See MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at 791.
107. It is worth acknowledging that Moore’s assessments of international law were
influenced heavily by his personal involvement in the practices of the U.S. State
Department. See W. Michael Reisman, Lassa Oppenheim’s Nine Lives, 19 YALE J. INT’L L.
255, 256 (1994).
108. MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at 791 (citing Report of Francis Wharton, Solicitor of
U.S. Dep’t of State, to Mr. Scruggs, Minister to Colombia (May 19, 1885)).
109. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 156 (Ronald F. Roxburgh
ed., 3d ed. 1920).
110. 2 id. § 363 (2d ed. 1912).
111. Id. § 335.
112. Id. § 363.
113. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 88, at 219.
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continental law as applied by domestic courts in private disputes. 114
Lauterpacht enthusiastically reconciled the Alabama tribunal’s notion of
due diligence with settled objective standards of reasonable behavior by
emphasizing the tribunal’s consideration of a “reasonable estimate on the
part of the defaulting State of the possible consequences of its
negligence.”115
Due diligence soon found support at the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) as well in the Corfu Channel case. In October 1946, two British Navy
destroyers lawfully present in Albanian territorial waters struck hidden
mines. 116 After its claims stalled at the United Nations Security Council, the
United Kingdom (U.K.) filed at the ICJ, alleging Albania had, inter alia,
failed its duty to warn the ships of the mines in breach of treaty law and
“general principles of international law.” 117 After concluding Albania must
have been aware of the mines, the Court affirmed the second U.K. claim,
reciting, “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” 118 The Court’s
endorsement of due diligence has been criticized as obiter dictum.119 Yet
the observation does not seem an entirely inappropriate statement of law in
the case when viewed as an expression of an underlying principle operating
contemporaneously with a narrower rule for decision and made in direct
response to a State litigant’s claim. Further, the Court held that the 1907
Hague Convention VIII—the primary source of the U.K. treaty claim—
applied only during war and was not relevant to the case in a formal
sense. 120 As a result, the U.K. resort to the international law principle of due
diligence seems justified. Nor was Albania a State party to the Hague
Convention, surely explaining, if not excusing, the Court’s resort to the
ambiguity of a by-then widely accepted principle over sector specific rules
114. Id. The passages Lauterpacht cites for this proposition are available in a compilation
of diplomatic papers on the Treaty of Washington. TREATY OF WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra
note 22, at 64–68.
115. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 88, at 218.
116. Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings
19, 20–21 (Sept. 30, 1947).
117. Id. at 21.
118. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
119. See, e.g., Jörg Schildknecht, Belligerent Rights and Obligations in International
Straits, in OPERATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY
CHALLENGES 67, 78 (Jörg Schildknecht et al. eds., 2018); Greg Lynham, The Sic Utere
Principle as Customary International Law: A Case of Wishful Thinking?, 2 JAMES COOK U.
L. REV. 172, 184 (1995).
120. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
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relating to mines at sea.121 Even Judge Azevedo’s dissenting opinion
agreed: the U.K. pleadings expressly invoked general principles of
international law, clearly inviting the Court to rule in that respect. 122
In sum, the Treaty of Washington and the resulting Alabama claims
decision illustrate that nineteenth-century U.S. and British foreign relations
practices clearly acknowledged a duty of due diligence owed to and from
other States as a matter of general international law. These early
expressions emerged earliest in contexts of dispute settlement, particularly
arising with respect to duties of neutrality such as the Jay Treaty and the
Treaty of Washington, and by analogy in the Caroline correspondence. But
they found clearest expression in the Treaty of Washington and at States’
positions at later treaty conferences. The U.S. and other States’ motives for
conceding duties of diligence were varied but found form in binding legal
terms, confirmed by a high-profile international treaty conference. Due
diligence proved particularly useful in contexts such as those involving the
Alabama and the Caroline where private parties were the proximate source
of harm or in the Corfu Channel case, where the true source of harm could
not be discerned. Due diligence operated as a convenient middle ground,
permitting an offending State to disclaim attribution of harm while
conceding an omission to the satisfaction of an injured State. Publicists and
international tribunals soon seized on these concessions of sovereignty to
law both as effective tools of peaceful settlements of disputes and also as
doctrinal aspects of States’ general international legal obligations toward
one another.
B. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
Established in 1896 in British Columbia, Canada along the Columbia
River, the Trail smelter processed locally mined ore to produce zinc and
lead. 123 Originally built under U.S. auspices, the smelter was acquired in
1906 by the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada
(Consolidated), a subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railway. 124
Consolidated grew the facility into the largest and best equipped smelter in
121. See id.
122. Id. at 84 (Azevedo, J., dissenting); see Memorial of United Kingdom, supra note
116, at 21.
123. See R.S. DEAN & R.E. SWAIN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT SUBMITTED TO
THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 6–7 (1944).
124. Kenneth B. Hoffman, State Responsibility in International Law and Transboundary
Pollution Injuries, 25 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 509, 521 (1976) (stating the Canadian Pacific
Railway was “the most powerful commercial activity in the Dominion”).
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North America.125 By 1927, construction of twin 400-foot exhaust stacks
further increased the smelter’s production capacity. 126
The Trail smelter sat approximately seven miles from Canada’s border
with the United States (eleven miles by the course of the Columbia
River). 127 Winds in the region generally moved southwest along the river
valley.128 On the U.S. side, the downwind region was devoted chiefly to
agriculture and logging.129 Several small towns in the state of Washington
sat within fifty miles of the Trail smelter. 130 A U.S.-owned copper smelter
had operated in the U.S. town closest to the border but was dismantled by
1921.131 However, sulfur dioxide recorders detected strong accumulations
even after the U.S. smelter closed. 132 Complaints by landowners and
farmers of crop and timber damage mounted through the 1920s. They
alleged the increased height of the Trail smelter’s new stacks widened the
downwind area affected, including U.S. territory. 133 Smoke from the
smelter was reportedly visible as far as thirty miles downwind. 134
In late 1927, after Consolidated had sporadically concluded private
damages settlements with several landowners in Washington state, the U.S.
government proposed the issue be dealt with diplomatically. 135 Negotiations
125. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1917 (Convention of Ottawa Tribunal
1938 & 1941); see also Statement of Facts Submitted by the Agent for the Gov’t of Can.,
Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. Pleadings 3, 3 (May 3, 1936).
126. Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L.
REV. 259, 260 (1971).
127. See Statement of Facts Submitted by the Agent for the Gov’t of Can., supra note
125, at 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1913–14.
131. See Statement of Facts Submitted by the Agent for the Gov’t of Can., supra note
125, at 3 (describing the Breen Copper Smelter at Northport, Washington).
132. See id. at 14.
133. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1917.
134. D.H. Dinwoodie, The Politics of International Pollution Control: The Trail Smelter
Case, 27 INT’L J. 219, 221 (1972).
135. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1918; Letter from W.R. Castle, U.S. Sec’y of State, to
William Phillips, U.S. Minister in Can. (Dec. 20, 1927), https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1928v02/d36. Commentators have remarked that the arbitration
reflected not only a surprising result in international law but also a peculiar conversion of
essentially private parties’ disputes, more suited to private domestic litigation, into a matter
of international law for a transnational tribunal. See, e.g., Martijn van de Kerkof, The Trail
Smelter Case Re-examined: Examining the Development of National Procedural
Mechanisms to Resolve a Trail Smelter Type Dispute, 27 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT J. INT’L &
EUR. L. 68, 69–70 (2011).
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quickly stalled and by July 1928, the United States and Canada referred the
dispute to the standing International Joint Commission, created previously
to address border-related issues.136 After collecting evidence in the affected
region, the Commission issued a non-binding report dated February 28,
1931. The Commission unanimously recommended Canada pay the United
States $350,000 (U.S.) in damages. 137
Initial U.S. government enthusiasm for the Commission’s
recommendation soon waned.138 Affected towns and farms in Washington
State received the Commission’s report poorly, deeming reparations
inadequate and promises to mitigate future pollution unreliable. 139 The
Commission had limited its recommendation to damage inflicted prior to
1932 and had surmised pollution would soon cease by the end of 1931. 140
The landowners’ skepticism proved warranted; extensive pollution
persisted from 1932 at least through 1937.141
After intense diplomatic wrangling, Canada and the United States finally
agreed to resolve the dispute through binding international arbitration,

136. The Commission was drawn under the auspices of a preexisting treaty between
Canada and the United States. See Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. IX,
Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
137. Rep. and Recommendations of the Int’l Joint Comm’n Established by the Treaty
Concluded Between the U.S. & Can. on 11 Jan. 1909, Signed at Toronto on 28 Feb. 1931, 29
R.I.A.A. 365, 368.
138. Dinwoodie, supra note 134, at 227–28 (citing Memorandum of Stimson’s Press
Conference, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 5, 1931)). Professor Dinwoodie attributes initial U.S.
support to President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s ambitions for
international law as a means for securing international peace. Id.
139. Hoffman, supra note 124, at 515.
140. The General Manager of the smelter indicated that imminent installation of sulfuric
acid units would significantly reduce the amount of sulfur emissions. Trail Smelter, 3
R.I.A.A. at 1919.
141. Letter from Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Pierre de L. Boal, U.S. Chargé
in Canada (Feb. 10, 1933), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v02/d37.
President Roosevelt suggested the United States and Canada submit the dispute to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, or as he called it, “the World Court at [T]he
Hague.” Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., to William Phillips, U.S.
Under Sec’y of State (Dec. 6, 1934), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934
v01/d719. The U.S. Under Secretary of State, William Phillips, raised the possibility of
international litigation at the PCIJ in a discussion with Canadian representatives.
Memorandum by William Phillips, U.S. Under Sec’y of State (Dec. 13, 1934),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d720. Canada did not respond
favorably. Id.
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memorializing their agreement in a bilateral treaty. 142 Under the treaty,
Canada agreed in advance to pay the United States $350,000 for all damage
prior to January 1932.143 The remainder of the treaty outlined procedures
for the arbitration of damages from 1932 forward. The treaty framed four
questions, including the legal questions of Canadian liability for further
damages and whether Canada owed a duty to cease the operations of the
Trail smelter.144 The parties’ choice of law incorporated U.S. law and
practice, “International Law and Practice,” and, in a seeming nod to equity,
consideration of “a solution just to all parties concerned.” 145 Some sources
trace the parties’ resort to U.S. law as an effort to simplify the tribunal’s
effort to address the meaning and scope of the term “damage” during the
arbitration.146 However, writing after the dispute, the Canadian Legal
Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the Canadian side
regarded U.S. tort law as far more favorable to Consolidated and the
Government of Canada. He indicated that incorporation of Canadian tort
law would have been “disastrous to the Smelter and to the economy of an
important part of British Columbia.”147
The Trail Smelter tribunal, comprised of three members, including a
member from each party and a neutral chairman, 148 issued its decision in
two phases beginning on April 16, 1938.149 In light of the treaty’s
concession of Canadian indemnity for damages prior to 1932, the arbitral
tribunal limited its consideration to liability and damage from 1932
forward.150 At the outset of its decision, the tribunal noted the difficulty,
even the impossibility, of determining the precise amount of economic
damage caused by the Trail smelter. 151 Turning to U.S. tort law, including
U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the tribunal determined that an
142. Convention for Settlement of the Damages Resulting from Operation of Smelter at
Trail, British Columbia, Can.-U.S., Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3245 [hereinafter Can.-U.S.
Smelter Convention].
143. Id. art. I.
144. Id. art. III.
145. Id. art. IV.
146. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 126, at 263.
147. John E. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 213, 227 (1963); see
also Rubin, supra note 126, at 263.
148. Can.-U.S. Smelter Convention, supra note 142, art. II. The Belgian jurist Jan Fans
Hostie of Belgium served as Chairman. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905,
1911 (Convention of Ottawa Tribunal 1938 & 1941).
149. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1905.
150. Id. at 1920.
151. See id.
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approximation would be legally sufficient to avoid “a perversion of
fundamental principles of justice.”152 On this basis, the tribunal moved to
the question of causation.
In its submissions, the Canadian government insisted the Trail smelter
caused no damage after January 1, 1932.153 Readings from sulfur dioxide
detectors and measurements of prevailing upper air currents along the
Columbia River valley ultimately convinced the tribunal otherwise. 154
Inspections identified an area of damage from the Trail smelter extending
approximately six miles into U.S. territory.155 The tribunal turned again to
U.S. tort law to determine indemnity amounts for various categories of
damage. 156 Although it rejected or declined to address several U.S. claims,
including “damages in respect of the wrong done the United States in
violation of sovereignty,” the tribunal awarded an additional $78,000 for
damages relating to loss of land use, reduced value of timber, and crop
damage after 1931.157
The tribunal then considered the legal questions of whether Canada must
cease further damage by the smelter and what measures must be adopted.
On the former issue, and in its most important finding as a matter of
international law, the tribunal determined Canada owed a duty to refrain
from permitting future damage. 158 To be clear, the tribunal did not attribute
pollution from the Trail smelter to the Government of Canada. Rather the
decision faulted Canada’s omission or failure to cease, as territorial
sovereign, particulate emissions into the United States.
The international legal support for this determination was unclear. The
1938 tribunal decision cited no legal authority for the question of a
Canadian due diligence in this respect. On the issue of future measures of
prevention, the tribunal delayed, requesting further information on available

152. Id. (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
563 (1931)).
153. Id. at 1922.
154. Curiously, the tribunal rejected a theory presented by witnesses from both parties
that surface winds, rather than upper air currents, were responsible for carrying smelter
emissions from the smelter to the affected areas of the United States. Id. at 1922–23.
155. Id. at 1924.
156. Id. at 1925, 1928–29 (first citing Ralston v. United Verde Copper Co., 37 F.2d 180,
183–84 (D. Ariz. 1929); and then citing 3 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 937a (9th ed. 1920)).
157. Id. at 1932–33. The tribunal did not rule on the U.S. sovereignty claim after
determining it was not anticipated in the scope the Convention. Id. at 1932.
158. Id. at 1934.
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technology.159 The tribunal did, however, order installation of detection
equipment at the Trail smelter to record emissions and to report back to the
tribunal pending resolution of the preceding technical questions. 160 The
tribunal also capped emissions to levels it determined would not result in
further damage to U.S. territory. 161
In 1941, after receiving updated data from the polluted region, the
tribunal issued its final decision. A U.S. petition to revisit and recalculate
the damages awarded in the 1938 decision led the tribunal to consider again
the question of choice of law it had evaded in its prior decision. 162 The
tribunal rejected the U.S. petition, determining that the 1938 award
amounted to res judicata as a matter of international law. 163 The tribunal
conceded that it had applied national law on some questions, as anticipated
by the Convention that formed it. 164 However, it emphasized an
international tribunal could not “depart from the rules of international law
in favor of divergent rules of national law unless, in refusing to do so, it
would undoubtedly go counter to the expressed intention of the treaties
whereupon its powers are based.” 165 The tribunal noted the Convention
limited application of U.S. law to “cognate” questions and reserved the
main legal issues, or as the tribunal termed them “general questions of law,”
to resolution by international law. 166
Returning to the international legal question of a Canadian duty to cease
further damage, the tribunal’s 1941 decision again noted debate regarding
whether these questions should be addressed under U.S. tort law or
international law. The tribunal resolved the question by noting sufficient
conformity of U.S. law with general international law on the subject of
cross-border harm.167 In particular, the tribunal cited ongoing work on State
responsibility, stating, “A State owes at all times a duty to protect other
States against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction.” 168
The tribunal also cited the Alabama arbitration and other resorts to a

159. Id.
160. Id. at 1934–35.
161. Id. at 1936.
162. Id. at 1948.
163. Id. at 1952.
164. See id. at 1949–50.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1950.
167. Id. at 1963.
168. Id. (quoting CLYDE EAGLETON, RESPONSIBILITY
80 (1928)).
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diligence principle between States, noting Canada had not questioned any
such precedent at any stage of the proceeding. 169
The only serious question concerning the state of international law, the
tribunal noted, was what constituted an injury for purposes of the due
diligence principle.170 On this question the tribunal, as it had previously
done in calculating damages, turned to U.S. national law. 171 On these bases,
the tribunal held that both U.S. law and principles of international law
identified “serious consequence . . . established by clear and convincing
evidence” as the relevant injury threshold for purposes of diligence. 172
The tribunal then announced its formulation of due diligence, indicating
“no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another.” 173
Applying the U.S. and international standards to ongoing and predicted
emissions by the smelter, the tribunal held, “the Dominion of Canada is
responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter.” 174
Accordingly, the tribunal devised a series of detailed operating conditions
and regulations for its continued operation estimated to keep harm below
the threshold required as a matter of international diligence. 175
Like the Alabama arbitral decision, the Trail Smelter decision attracted
significant private commentary and produced a lasting and influential legal
legacy. An early scholarly—though it must be emphasized, neither
detached nor neutral—treatment of the Trail Smelter decision characterized
the case as based on private nuisance rather than the classic fare of
international law. 176 International law, it was estimated, operated
exclusively with respect to inter-State conduct and duties.177 The critique
argued the decision only overcame these difficulties by “transmuting the
claims by individuals against the Trail Smelter into claims sounding in
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1964–65 (surveying U.S. Supreme Court cases on air and water pollution
between states).
172. Id. at 1965.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1974–78. The capital cost of the tribunal’s mitigation regime reportedly ran to
$20 million. Read, supra note 147, at 221.
176. See Read, supra note 147, at 222. Read, a former Justice of the International Court
of Justice, may not have provided an entirely objective analysis in his article. He had served
as Legal Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada for the duration of the Trail
Smelter dispute. See id. at 213, 225.
177. See id. at 223.
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international tort by the United States against Canada.”178 In this respect,
the critique claimed the decision represented a departure from, rather than
an application of, the usual convention for international legal claims. 179
The same account also suggested that benevolence on the part of Canada
rather than correct application of international law explained the arbitral
result. Neither of the prime ministers that held office during the dispute
approached the negotiations with the United States as “horse-trading” or
zero-sum prospects.180 Both Canadian leaders reportedly instructed their
representatives to pursue an outcome that would profit both sides. 181 The
dispute also coincided with a reduction in Canada’s imperial ties to the
United Kingdom, perhaps reflecting a turn toward closer relations with the
United States.182 The Canadians’ concessions have also been explained as
inducements for the United States to reduce or eliminate trade tariffs. 183 By
this explanation, the Convention that established the arbitral tribunal
reflected a combination of Canadian goodwill and perceived opportunity as
much as, or more than, prevailing international law.184
A later academic examination of the decision also criticized the
tribunal’s resort to international law as both selective and overreaching. 185
According to Professor Rubin, the Trail Smelter tribunal exceeded the
parties’ mandate by resorting to international law to resolve questions
answerable under U.S. law, such as whether its 1938 decision amounted to
res judicata.186 Examining the travaux that produced the parties’
instructions to the tribunal on law, Professor Rubin argued the United States
and Canada had determined there was “not much international law available
dealing with international nuisance.” 187 He explained that the need to
supplement international law with domestic precedent was essential to
providing the tribunal an effective rule for decision and was one of the few

178. Id.
179. See id. at 225. Others have questioned the decision’s precedential value despite its
prominent place in the legal canon. Karin Michelson, Rereading Trail Smelter, 31 CAN. Y.B.
INT’L L. 219, 219–20 (1993) (regarding the decision as “more an object of reverence than a
subject of analysis”).
180. Read, supra note 147, at 225.
181. Id.
182. Dinwoodie, supra note 134, at 224.
183. Id. at 230.
184. See Read, supra note 147, at 225.
185. See generally Rubin, supra note 126.
186. Id. at 262–63.
187. Id. at 263 (quoting Read, supra note 147, at 227).
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points on which the United States and Canada agreed. 188 He further
emphasized both sides reportedly entered the Convention negotiations
“determined to avoid the possibility of finding a non liquet.”189 Thus, the
tribunal’s unequivocal resort to international law, particularly to announce
Canada’s duty to refrain from permitting damage, Rubin argued,
represented both a dramatic departure from the parties’ intention to form a
tribunal of limited jurisdiction and an unwarranted assumption of the duties
of an international court.190
Professor Rubin was similarly unimpressed by the tribunal’s substantive
interpretations of international law. He accused the tribunal of “applying
United States constitutional law precedents to the international law field by
analogy.”191 Professor Rubin’s critique should not, however, be overstated.
His dissatisfaction with the tribunal’s alleged interpretive overreach applied
specifically to the questions of recovery of damages and the question of air
pollution between sovereigns rather than to the general issue of due
diligence between States.192 His critique is better understood as
dissatisfaction with the tribunal’s resolution of cognate legal questions
relating to context, application, damage thresholds, and remedies rather
than with the foundational question of international responsibility for harm
or an obligation of due diligence between States.
Most academic attention to the Trail Smelter decision, however,
investigates its status as a basis for international environmental law,
specifically whether harm to the natural environment is cognizable in
international law. 193 The tribunal’s veiled, 1941 observations on the general
international law duty of due diligence are often overlooked. Along with the

188. Id.
189. Read, supra note 147, at 227. Non liquet refers to judicial notice of an absence of
law or failure to identify a rule of decision. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet, OXFORD
PUB. INT’L L., https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801
99231690-e1669 (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
190. Rubin, supra note 126, at 264. Professor Rubin observed, “[T]he tribunal seems to
have acted as an authoritative arbiter of international law, notwithstanding the more
restrictive language of the compromis.” Id. at 268.
191. Id. at 268.
192. See id. at 266–68.
193. Hoffman, supra note 124, at 509 (judging the Trail Smelter decision, “the most
widely quoted arbitral authority in the area of international pollution” (citing Samuel A.
Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25
(1972))).
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Corfu Channel judgment and the Lake Lanoux arbitration,194 Trail Smelter
has been characterized as a “disjointed trilogy” of international
environmental law.195 Dismissive analyses note that only the latter
concerned cross-border pollution lying clearly in international
environmental law.196 The Trail Smelter tribunal’s decision has been
explained as peculiar to its circumstances and therefore of limited
precedential value, an inexorably contextualized decision. 197 The source of
damage was indisputable, the case involved significant economic interests
of both sides, each faced similar risk of liability as both a potential polluter
and victim, and the States in question enjoyed a history of cooperation as
evidenced by the preexisting Boundary Water treaty. 198 Absent any such
condition, it is argued, neither side would have committed the question of
liability to a mechanism of international law. 199
While perhaps effective to critique environmental obligations, it must be
conceded each decision of the Corfu-Trail-Lanoux trilogy expresses clear
international law support for the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laeda or sic utero tuo, a command to use property so as not to harm
another.200 Whatever allegations might attach to the Trail Smelter
arbitration with respect to innovating international environmental law, the
episode reflects both the tribunal and States’ parties’ sound confirmation of
a general notion of due diligence to cease harm. In fact, the nascent or even
non-existent precedent for recognition of environmental claims in Trail
Smelter bolsters the independent and freestanding character of the due
diligence obligation. That is, had international law unequivocally included a
duty to prevent environmental harm, the Trail Smelter decision might be
dismissed as a mere elaboration of a context-specific duty of diligence. But
194. See generally Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Fr.-Spain
Arb. Trib. 1957); Brunson MacChesney, Judicial Decisions, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 156, 156–71
(1959).
195. Michelson, supra note 179, at 221.
196. See id. at 222–23. Professor Brownlie referred to the Trail Smelter decision as
“overworked.” Ian Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental
Protection, 13 NAT. RES. J. 179, 180 (1973).
197. Michelson, supra note 179, at 230–31 (observing that under misguided political
interpretations Trail Smelter “dwindles into insignificance, an object of little more than
historical interest”).
198. Id. at 227–29.
199. See id. at 229–30.
200. The Corfu Channel Court’s reference to an obligation not to allow territory to be
used to harm the rights of other States has been equated with the sic utero tuo principle. See
id. at 221.
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rather than a secondary duty with respect to environmental obligations, the
parties’ arguments and concessions and the tribunal’s ruling on due
diligence reflect application of a default or baseline duty of due diligence
irrespective of particular context or setting.
Assessing the legal significance of the decision, parallels between the
Alabama claims arbitration decision and Trail Smelter are noteworthy. Both
arbitrations addressed harm to another State not directly attributable to the
offending State as such. Neither decision attributed the proximate cause of
harm to the territorial sovereign of its source; in both cases, the harm
alleged was directly traceable to acts of private parties. In both arbitrations,
the offending State initially asserted, but ultimately abandoned, arguments
that a State cannot be held responsible under international law for harm
caused by the acts of private parties.201 In this sense, both arbitrations
addressed omissions on the part of the offending State rather than positive
acts. Both the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations saw the United States
advocate due diligence as both a principle and baseline rule of general
international law, as well as a rule of conduct applicable to a specific
context of international interaction, neutrality in armed conflict and
environmental law respectively. The members of both arbitral tribunals
accepted these arguments with respect to a general international law duty
on the part of States to cease harm emanating from their borders into the
territory of another sovereign. Finally, both arbitrations successfully
resolved highly contentious disputes between otherwise close allies.
III. Present Perspectives
Based in significant part on the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitral
decisions and their progeny, current international law sources consistently
recognize due diligence as a fundamental principle. Meanwhile, private
commentators and organizations cite due diligence as relevant to emerging
issues in international relations, such as harmful transboundary cyber
activities. Two recent ICJ judgments, based in significant part on due
diligence as a rule of international environmental law, have confirmed in
broad terms States’ general duty to cease harm that emanates from their
territory. Additionally, the International Law Association has formed two
study groups to address due diligence specifically. States and private
201. See, e.g., Letter from R.B. Bennett, Canadian Sec’y of State for External Affs., to
Warren D. Robbins, U.S. Minister in Can. (Feb. 17, 1934), https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d694 (asserting “the alleged facts complained of were civil
and not international wrongs”).
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parties, through international organizations and, with respect to the former
in increasingly common expressions of opinio juris, offer increasingly clear
positions on the fit between cyberspace and international law generally as
well as specific notions of due diligence in cyber contexts. Their work
highlights a number of doctrinal considerations worthy of attention from the
United States and other States.
A. Due Diligence in International Law
Two recent ICJ judgments discuss the principle of due diligence in some
detail. Both cases arose in the context of international environmental law
but lend insight into the application of due diligence as a principle under
general international law. Both cases unquestioningly embrace and apply
due diligence as both a principle of international law and a regime-specific
rule.
On May 4, 2006, Argentina instituted proceedings against Uruguay at the
ICJ, alleging breaches the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay. 202
Argentina’s claims concerned Uruguay’s approval of construction of two
pulp mills along the River Uruguay. 203 Argentina argued the mills required
notification and consultation under Articles 7 to 12 of the treaty. 204
Specifically, Argentina alleged a failure of due diligence with respect to
Uruguay’s construction and operation of the mills. 205 Construction had
caused and would continue to cause significant damage to the water quality
of the river, resulting in significant transboundary harm to Argentina. 206
Argentina argued,
Uruguay should have taken three steps to comply with the
requirements of due diligence and its obligation to prevent
damage to the environment, namely: (1) establish the initial
quality of the waters receiving the pollutants, (2) identify as
clearly as possible the volume and characteristics of the
pollutants which the mill will have to discharge into the river and
(3) establish that the waters receiving the anticipated polluting

202. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 1 (Apr. 20).
203. Id.
204. Id. ¶ 67.
205. Memorial of Argentina, Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2007 I.C.J.
Pleadings 1, ¶ 5.3 (Jan. 15, 2007).
206. Id.
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discharges are able to receive them and then disperse them in
such a way as to prevent any harm. 207
The Court responded favorably to Argentina’s legal formulation,
invoking the Corfu Channel case definition of due diligence while also
endorsing a duty of prevention. 208 The Court observed in relevant part,
“[T]he principle of prevention, as a customary rule has its origins in the due
diligence that is required of a State in its territory. It is ‘every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other States.’”209 The Court then translated the due diligence
principle of general international law into a specific rule applied to the
context of international environmental law. Referring to its decision in the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the
Court stated:
A State is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in
order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in
any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the
environment of another State. This Court has established that
this obligation “is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment.”210
Discerning further nuance to the rule of due diligence in international
environmental law, the Court observed:
Moreover, due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and
prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have
been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the
régime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake
an environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of
such works.211

207. Id. ¶ 5.31.
208. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 101. Though the Court engaged in a
detailed review of the environmental effects alleged in the case, in the end, it determined that
“there is no conclusive evidence in the record to show that Uruguay has not acted with the
requisite degree of due diligence.” Id. ¶ 265.
209. Id. ¶ 101 (quoting Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22
(Apr. 9)).
210. Id. (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Reports 226, ¶ 29 (July 8)).
211. Id. ¶ 204.
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The same year the ICJ issued its Pulp Mills judgment, the Court began
proceedings in the Border Area case that returned to the principle of due
diligence. Like the Pulp Mills case, this case arose in the context of
international environmental law, but again presented the Court an
opportunity to address due diligence as a general international law
principle.212 The Border Area case arose from Costa Rican allegations that
Nicaragua had occupied Costa Rican territory and impermissibly carried
out dredging operations in a channel of the San Juan River. 213 Costa Rica
alleged the operations were “in violation of [Nicaragua’s] international
obligations.”214 After Costa Rica filed its case in 2011, Nicaragua instituted
proceedings against Costa Rica, alleging “violations of Nicaraguan
sovereignty and major environmental damages on its territory” by means of
road construction beside the San Juan River along the border between the
two countries. 215 Both sides’ claims cited the international law principle of
due diligence. 216
In a 2015 judgment, the Border Area Court reiterated its conclusions of
law from the Pulp Mills case, restating the due diligence obligation and
reemphasizing the preventative aspects of diligence with respect to
environmental harm. The Court stated, in relevant part:
to fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing
significant transboundary environmental harm, a State must,
before embarking on an activity having the potential adversely to
affect the environment of another State, ascertain if there is a
risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the
requirement to carry out an environmental impact assessment. 217
The Court then reemphasized its decision concerning the application of the
due diligence principle to international environmental law, concluding:
if the environmental impact assessment confirms that there is a
risk of significant transboundary harm, a State planning an
activity that carries such a risk is required, in order to fulfil its
obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant
212. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica
v. Nicar.) and Construction of Road in Costa Rica Along San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa
Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16).
213. Id. ¶ 1.
214. Id.
215. Id. ¶ 9.
216. Id. ¶¶ 101–103.
217. Id. ¶ 104.
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transboundary harm, to notify, and consult with, the potentially
affected State in good faith, where that is necessary to determine
the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk. 218
Two important points concerning the present state of due diligence can
be drawn from these ICJ cases. First, the filings of the several States party
to the litigation evince clear support for the notion of due diligence both in
a general international legal sense and in specific contexts of international
relations involving transboundary environmental harm. No State party to
either case unequivocally rejected due diligence as either an international
legal principle or as a regime-specific rule of conduct in its submissions to
the Court. Second, the Court not only reaffirmed its earlier Corfu Channel
observations concerning a general duty of due diligence, it also discerned
refinements to the duty, most obviously in the form of a duty to prevent
harm. Though the Court’s conclusions most clearly apply to a contextspecific application of the due diligence principle, as discussed immediately
below, they may provide interesting considerations for the further
development of due diligence in other areas, such as transboundary cyber
activities.
Private commentators have seized similar observations. On the issue of
prevention, the International Law Commission proposed draft articles on
“Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities” in 2001. 219
Article 3 states “The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to
prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk
thereof.”220 As noted in the Commission’s commentary to the Article, the
focus of the articles and the duty they purport to assign “deals with the
phase prior to the situation where significant harm or damage might
actually occur.”221 Though focused largely on transboundary environmental
harm, these draft articles would potentially impact a much broader set of
activities if extrapolated to a general duty of due diligence.
At the time of the Draft Articles’ referral to the UN General Assembly,
many States commented on their virtue, some referring to them as reflective
of customary international law. 222 The United States, however, rejected that
notion. In its statement, the United States commented:
218. Id. ¶ 168.
219. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 146–48 (2001).
220. Id. at 153.
221. Id. at 148.
222. Press Release, Sixth Comm., Sixth Committee Hears of Proposed Treaty on
Transboundary Harm Resulting from Hazardous Activities: Law Commission Chairman
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We continue to believe it is most appropriate for the draft articles
to be treated as non-binding standards to guide the conduct and
practice of states, and for the work on prevention of
transboundary harm to remain formulated as draft articles.
Retaining the current, recommendatory form of these draft
articles and principles increases the likelihood that they will gain
widespread consideration and fulfill their intended purposes of
providing a valuable resource for States in this area. With respect
to this agenda item, the United States position has not changed
since our last statement.
As we have previously noted, both the draft articles and draft
principles go beyond the present state of international law and
practice, and are clearly innovative and aspirational in character
rather than descriptive of current law or state practice.223
The articles have never progressed beyond the “draft” stage, though they
continue to be influential in State interactions, particularly with respect to
international environmental law as discussed above.
Meanwhile, in related private work and in response to growing academic
and diplomatic attention to the principle of due diligence, the International
Law Association (ILA) commissioned a study group “to consider the extent
to which there is a commonality of understanding between the distinctive
areas of international law in which the concept of due diligence is
applied.”224 The group issued its First Report in 2014; a second study group
revisited the issue in a 2016 Report. 225 The First Report summarized the
history and development of due diligence in international law “to stimulate
further discussion” at a conference to develop a Second Report.226 The
Second Report, informed by the background material collected by the First,
employed a “thematic and analytical, rather than sectoral, approach” to due
diligence.227 The study group concerned itself “less with how due diligence
Sees Prevention as Primary Aim, with Likely Impact on International Environmental Rules,
U.N. Press Release GA/L/3191 (Nov. 2, 2001).
223. David Bigge, Statement at the 74th General Assembly Sixth Committee Agenda Item
81: Consideration of Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://usun.usmission.gov/statementat-the-74th-general-assembly-sixth-committee-agenda-item-81-consideration-of-preventionof-transboundary-harm-from-hazardous-activities/.
224. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
225. Id.; ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
226. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
227. ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
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is used in specific fields and more with broader, analytical questions,
concerning what functions due diligence serves, and why it is employed as a
standard of conduct in many and varied areas of international law.”228
Several useful considerations emerge from the ILA reports. First, the
Group conceded that “[p]recisely how the due diligence standard is applied
is still subject to considerable discussion and debate.” 229 Both Reports
concluded that, though the existence of the principle receives wide
acceptance and general support, the details of the application of the
principle vary widely. In fact, the Reports describe due diligence as an
“open-ended standard or principle”230 and as a “flexible concept, the
content of which varied depending on the circumstances of the case.” 231
These observations led the Second Report to assert, “[t]his broad
principle of due diligence can be understood as underlying more specific
rules of due diligence. Hence, it can be viewed as a default standard that is
triggered in operation if no more specific elaboration of due diligence or
stricter standard is in existence.” 232 The Second Report described due
diligence as an “expansive, sectorally-specific yet overarching concept of
increasingly [sic] relevance in international law.”233 In other words, due
diligence is an accepted general baseline standard of care in States’ dealings
with one another that has also developed in specific sectors—such as
international environmental law—into more well-defined “specific primary
rules.”234 The ILA Group’s conclusions make an important point with
respect to emerging domains of State interaction such as cyberspace,
suggesting that cyber activities are governed by the more general principle
of due diligence, but that no sector-specific rules have yet been agreed upon
by States.
A second important point from the Reports concerns the prevailing
default or baseline standard of care attendant to due diligence. The Reports
note general agreement that the principle of due diligence operates as a
standard of conduct and not of result or outcomes. 235 And in qualitative
228. Id.
229. Id. at 7.
230. Id. at 3.
231. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
232. ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
233. Id. at 47.
234. Id. at 6.
235. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 17; ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. See
generally Antal Berkes, The Standard of ‘Due Diligence’ as a Result of Interchange
Between the Law of Armed Conflict and General International Law, 3 J. CONFLICT SEC. L.
433 (2018) (describing due diligence as an obligation of conduct rather than of result).
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terms, the Second Report identified the standard of conduct by States as one
of “reasonableness,” consistent with conceptions of due diligence dating
back at least to the Alabama arbitration and publicists’ reactions thereto. 236
Further, the Report found application of a State’s reasonableness “will tend
to be assessed on an ex post facto basis to determine compliance and
responsibility.”237 The retroactive nature of the principle led the Report to
question the ability of States to “ascertain clearly, and in advance, that they
are satisfactorily meeting – and continuing to meet – their obligations of
conduct.”238
A final important point from the ILA Reports with respect to the
impending application of due diligence to cyber activities concerns
application of the principle of due diligence to non-state actors. The Reports
fell short of applying due diligence per se to non-state actors but noted a
duty on the part of States “to prevent and punish the unlawful acts of armed
groups even when those armed groups are not controlled by the
government.”239
While the work of the ILA Study Groups identified important issues
related to the principle of due diligence, the Second Report admitted
“further work on due diligence [was] deemed appropriate.” 240 The ILA
Study Group recommended the ILA “undertake further study and . . .
propose a resolution identifying the material factors and underlying
principles helpful in the identification and operation of due diligence as a
standard of conduct in international law.”241 All things considered, the ILA
reports reflect a careful and conservative effort to restate the principle of
due diligence. The ILA Study Groups appear to have resisted the temptation
to develop the principle themselves or to subsume a lawmaking function.
But, as the Reports concede, the present state of the due diligence principle
remains underdeveloped in many respects and subject to substantial
contextual variance.
The uncertain state of due diligence identified by the ILA is confirmed
by the present U.S. position—or perhaps more descriptively, the lack of a
236. ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
237. Id. at 7.
238. Id.
239. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 13–14 (citing British Claims in Spanish Zone of
Morocco (Spain v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A. 615 (1924)); ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 29
(citing Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶
172 (July 29, 1988)).
240. ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 47.
241. Id.
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position—with respect to due diligence. There does not appear to be a
current or updated official position from the U.S. government on the
international law principle of due diligence. This is true despite the two
previously analyzed historical incidents wherein the United States clearly
advocated the principle and prevailed on the merits of its application.
Silence on the part of the U.S. government might be taken to indicate the
United States has not changed its views from the positions taken in the
Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations, but even that much cannot be
confirmed with certainty. Lack of support for the principle of due diligence
when the opportunity presented itself, such as in the United Nations Group
of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) discussed below, has led to assumed
skepticism in some quarters.242
ICJ recognition of due diligence as both a general principle and a sectorspecific duty and the confirmation of this approach by the ILA study groups
confirm the dual incarnations of due diligence. Hesitance on the part of the
United States to endorse a specific rule in the context of the UN GGE on
cyber activities, in contrast with prior advocacy of the general principle in
the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations, may suggest a similar
bifurcation with respect to due diligence. However, the ubiquity of cyber
activities and their potential to inflict significant transboundary harm may
encourage States to look to sector-specific rule applications of due diligence
as analogies in the cyber context.
B. International Law and Cyberspace
Renewed interest in the principle of due diligence, as evidenced by State
filings at the ICJ and the ILA’s study groups, has coincided with an
escalation in the number of transnational cyber incidents resulting in
significant harm. Over the past decade in particular, the number and
severity of cyber operations resulting in damage have dramatically
increased.243 Many of these cyber activities have been attributed to States or
State proxies,244 causing some to argue for clear statements on the
applicability of international law to cyber activities. 245
242. See, e.g., HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 21.
243. How Cyber Attacks Have Grown in Scale over the Past 10 Years, SBS NEWS (June
28, 2017), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/how-cyber-attacks-have-grown-in-scale-over-thepast-10-years.
244. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million
People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-ofpersonnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html (describing the hacking of the
Department of Defense’s Classified network and OPM); Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story
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In response to the dramatic increase in cyber activities with
transboundary impacts, States convened a Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) through the United Nations General Assembly to discuss
“Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of International Security.”246 The process began in the late 1990s
and has perhaps enjoyed pride of place as the leading forum for States to
debate and develop or confirm international regulations and norms of
conduct in cyberspace.247 At present, the UN GGE has convened five times.
The third meeting, in 2013, generated a consensus report, as did the fourth
meeting in 2015. The most recently completed UN GGE meeting, in 2017,
however, was unable to achieve consensus on a final report.248 Yet the
contents of the 2013 and 2015 reports still stand as prominent, if
ambiguous, expressions of States’ present views on international law and
cyberspace. They are worth examining briefly for clues to States’

of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/
(expounding Russia’s NotPetya attack that was intended for Ukraine but spread around the
world causing more than $10 billion worth of damages); John Leyden, Hack on Saudi
Aramco Hit 30,000 Workstations, Oil Firm Admits, REGISTER (Aug. 29, 2012),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/29/saudi_aramco_malware_attack_analysis/
(describing Iran’s malware attack that turned 30,000 of Saudi Aramco’s computers useless);
Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials
Say, WASH. POST (June 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6
U_story.html (explaining the United States’ use of Stuxnet to destroy nuclear centrifuges in
Iran); David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power
Grid, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/trumpcyber-russia-grid.html (discussing the United States’ hacking into Russia’s power grid for its
sabotaging of U.S. power plants, water supplies, and other public necessities); Scott Shane &
Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russiainterference-election-trump-clinton.html (reviewing Russia’s known meddling in U.S.
elections).
245. See, e.g., Catherine Lotrionte, State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A
Normative Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825, 831–32
(2012).
246. Anders Henriksen, The End of the Road for the UN GGE Process: The Future
Regulation of Cyberspace, 5 J. CYBERSECURITY, no. 1, 2019, at 1–2.
247. Id.
248. Arun M. Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace
Doomed As Well?, LAWFARE : BLOG (July 4, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
un-gge-failed-international-law-cyberspace-doomed-well.
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perspectives on the fit between international law and cyberspace generally,
as well as for clues to views on due diligence.
The 2012-2013 iteration of the UN GGE, consisting of fifteen States, 249
issued a landmark consensus report at the conclusion of its meetings. 250 The
report recognized, “[t]here has been a noticeable increase in risk in recent
years as [Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)] are used
for crime and the conduct of disruptive activities.” 251 The Report concluded,
“[i]nternational cooperation is essential to reduce risk and enhance
security.”252 Participating States agreed to three important statements
concerning international law and cyber activities.
The first deals with the application of international law. The Report
states “[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the United
Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and
promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.” 253
Though useful, the UN GGE statement is watered down by comparison
with a statement offered by the United States during deliberations. In its
submission to the Group, the United States argued that “existing
international law serves as the appropriate framework applicable to activity
in cyberspace in a variety of contexts, including in connection with
hostilities.”254 The U.S. submission offered specifics regarding how both
the ius ad bellum (the right to resort to armed conflict) and the ius in bello
(the conduct of the parties engaged in armed conflict) applied to cyber
actions,255 arguing, “the difficulty of reaching a definitive legal conclusion
or consensus among States on when and under what circumstances a hostile
cyber action would constitute an armed attack does not automatically
249. The States involved were Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt,
Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Rep. of
the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, transmitted by Letter dated 7
June 2013 from the Chair of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info.
and Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l Sec., U.N. Doc. A/68/98, annex (June 24, 2013)
[hereinafter 2013 UN GGE Report].
250. See id. ¶ 34.
251. Id. ¶ 1.
252. Id. ¶ 2.
253. Id. ¶ 19.
254. U.S. Delegation Remarks at U.N. General Assembly Sixty-Seventh Session, in
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 600 (Carrie Lyn D. Guymon
ed., 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Delegation Remarks].
255. Id.; PARRY & GRANT ENCYCLOPÆDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 322–23
(John P. Grant & J. Craig Barker eds., 3d ed. 2009).
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suggest that we need an entirely new legal framework specific to
cyberspace.”256 The view that the existing legal paradigm is applicable,
sufficient, and can be used by analogy in dealing with the “challenges”
presented by cyber operations is a consistent theme throughout the U.S.
submission. 257
The second important UN GGE statement concerning international law
and cyber activities indicates “State sovereignty and international norms
and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICTrelated activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within
their territory.”258 Though there is general agreement that the international
law principle of sovereignty applies to state-sponsored cyber activities, how
sovereignty applies has become one of the most contentious discussions
amongst both States259 and academics.260 While the U.S. position on
sovereignty in cyberspace is not entirely clear, 261 the U.S. submission to the
2013 UN GGE stated simply, “State sovereignty, among other longstanding international legal principles, must be taken into account in the

256. Harold Koh, U.S. State Dep’t Legal Advisor, Remarks at USCYBERCOM (Sept.
18, 2012), in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 597 (Carrie Lyn
D. Guymon ed., 2012).
257. U.S. Delegation Remarks, supra note 254, at 600–02.
258. 2013 UN GGE Report, supra note 249, ¶ 20.
259. See infra Section III.C.
260. See generally Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in
Cyberspace, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1639 (2017); Sean Watts & Theodore Richard, Baseline
Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771 (2018); Gary Corn,
Punching on the Edges of the Grey Zone: Iranian Cyber Threats and State Cyber Responses,
JUST SEC. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68622/punching-on-the-edges-of-thegrey-zone-iranian-cyber-threats-and-state-cyber-responses/; Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the
Use of Force in Cyber Space: The Application of the Law of Armed Conflict During a Time of
Fundamental Change in the Nature of Warfare, 60 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2010).
261. Paul Ney, the Department of Defense General Counsel, recently stated,
As a threshold matter, in analyzing proposed cyber operations, DoD lawyers
take into account the principle of State sovereignty. States have sovereignty
over the information and communications technology infrastructure within their
territory. The implications of sovereignty for cyberspace are complex, and we
continue to study this issue and how State practice evolves in this area, even if
it does not appear that there exists a rule that all infringements on sovereignty
in cyberspace necessarily involve violations of international law.
Paul C. Ney, Dep’t of Def. Gen. Counsel, Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal
Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/
2099378/dod-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/ [hereinafter
Ney Remarks].
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conduct of activities in cyberspace, including outside of the context of
armed conflict.”262
Finally, the 2013 UN GGE Report confirms, “States must meet their
international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable
to them. States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful
acts. States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by nonState actors for unlawful use of ICTs.”263 The United States unequivocally
supported this strong statement on the use of proxies. In its 2013
submission, the United States identified the enticing nature of and
increasing use of proxies by States. 264 The United States argued that “a
State is legally responsible for cyber activities undertaken through ‘proxy
actors’ who act on the State’s instructions or under its direction or
control.”265
The consensus statements concerning the applicability of international
law to cyber activities in the 2013 UN GGE Report are significant because
they are the first multinational statements of their kind. They provide a vital
starting point for the application of international law to cyber activities.
However, they are almost as important for their lack of consensus on other
fundamental issues, including some strongly advocated for by the United
States such as the applicability of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to
cyber operations during hostilities. 266 Many of these issues were considered
again when an expanded group of States met in 2015.
The 2015 UN GGE expanded from fifteen States to twenty. 267 Building
on its predecessor, the 2015 Report added several key points. Two key
points agreed upon by the 2015 group of States reflect directly on the
application of international law to cyber activities. First, all participants
agreed that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs.”268 Second, the group agreed on a
more detailed application of this obligation with respect to critical

262. DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 737 (Carrie Lyn D.
Guymon ed., 2014) [hereinafter 2014 U.S. PRACTICE DIGEST] (recounting the U.S. position
taken in its statement to the UN GGE).
263. 2013 UN GGE Report, supra note 249, ¶ 23.
264. See 2014 U.S. PRACTICE DIGEST, supra note 262, at 738.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 736.
267. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc.
A/70/174, annex (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 UN GGE Report].
268. Id. ¶ 13(c).
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infrastructure269 and cyber emergency response teams. 270 This obligation to
prevent transboundary harm, and its relation to the principle of due
diligence, will be discussed more fully below.
As with the 2013 Report, the 2015 Report called for future meetings,
including “regular institutional dialogue with broad participation under the
auspices of the United Nations, as well as regular dialogue through
bilateral, regional and multilateral forums and other international
organizations.”271 The most recent meeting was similarly expected to issue
a report but was unable to reach consensus and disbanded in June 2017. 272
It appears Cuba, China, and Russia finally refused to sign the proposed
draft,273 at least in part based on the United States and others continuing
desire to state that the LOAC regulated cyber activities in armed conflict. 274
A commentator observed:
In reaction to the June 2017 UN GGE disappointment, the
American representative noted that the US had come to the
“unfortunate conclusion that those who are unwilling to affirm
the applicability of these international legal rules and principles
believe their states are free to act in or through cyberspace to
achieve their political ends with no limit on their actions” and
that this is “a dangerous and unsupportable view”. Although the
US representative did not name states like China and Russia, the
insinuation was quite clear. Frustration with what appears to be
intentional obstruction by at least certain states was also
noticeable in remarks delivered in the First Committee’s
discussions of the lack of a fifth UN GGE consensus report in
October 2017 by the German Representative. 275
After the failure of the 2017 GGE, commentators seemed skeptical that
future meetings would occur.276 However, the UN GGE process has
recently resumed, with twenty-five member States and a schedule to
269. Id. ¶ 13(f).
270. Id. ¶ 13(k).
271. Id. ¶ 18.
272. Henriksen, supra note 246, at 3.
273. Id.
274. Id. (quoting Miguel Rodríguez, Representative of Cuba, Declaration at the Final
Session of Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (June 23, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf).
275. Id. at 5.
276. See id. at 6.
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complete their work in May 2021.277 In addition, the General Assembly also
initiated an Open-Ended Working Group which is open to all Member
States and which is charged with consulting industry, civil society, and
academia.278 Despite the failure of the 2016-17 UN GGE, the General
Assembly appears committed to continue pushing toward the development
of norms and increased statements on practice to facilitate a clearer
understanding of the application of international law to cyber activities.
In addition to the United Nations GGE, other multinational
organizations, and many States have separately expressed their views on the
applicability of international law to cyber operations. This includes
statements by Australia,279 Bolivia,280 Ecuador,281 Estonia,282 France, 283
Guatemala,284 Guyana,285 Netherlands,286 Peru,287 United Kingdom, 288 and
277. Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., https://www.un.org/
disarmament/ict-security/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2021); Group of Governmental Experts, U.N.
OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., https://www.un.org/disarmament/group-of-governmentalexperts/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
278. U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., FACT SHEET : DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF
INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 2
(July
2019),
https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/
Information-Security-Fact-Sheet-July-2019.pdf.
279. AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE U.N., AUSTRALIAN PAPER — OPEN ENDED WORKING
GROUP ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Sept. 2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/unodaweb/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/fin-australian-oewg-national-paper-Sept-2019.pdf.
280. HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 7–8.
281. Id. at 7.
282. Kersti Kaljulaid, President of Estonia, Keynote Address at the Opening of CyCon
2019 (May 29, 2019), https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-presidentof-the-republic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html [hereinafter Estonia Cyber
Statement].
283. RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO
OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE (2019) [hereinafter France Cyber Statement]. We have not
labeled these as “French views” because at least one scholar has pointed out that the
document is authored by the French Ministry of Defense, and its contents may not be
attributable to the French State as a whole. See Corn, supra note 260 (“[I]t should be noted
that despite numerous assertions to the contrary, the French document does not claim to be
the official position of the French government. It was written and published by the French
Ministère des Armées (MdA), in the same vain as the DoD Law of War Manual which does
not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Government as a whole.”).
284. Hollis, supra note 3, at 8.
285. Id.
286. Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affs. to the President of the House of
Representatives on the Int’l Legal Order in Cyberspace (July 5, 2019), https://www.
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the United States.289 Despite the fact that many of these separate statements
reinforce the application of international law to cyber activities, the
breakdown of the UN GGE clearly indicates that this is not a consensus
view.
Meanwhile, simultaneous to the UN GGE process, private commentators
increasingly offered views on the application of international law to States’
activities in cyberspace. In the aftermath of a 2007 cyber incident that
crippled Estonian public and private cyber capabilities, 290 the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence convened a group of
experts291 to draft a manual applying the law of war to cyber operations. In
2013, the group published the Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (The Tallinn Manual).292 In response to
subsequent comments, a similar group of experts convened to study the
operation of public international law generally to States’ cyber activities. In
2017, the group published the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law

government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/parliamentary-documents/
2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace
[hereinafter Netherlands Cyber Statement].
287. Hollis, supra note 3, at 8.
288. Jeremy Wright, Att’y Gen., Speech on Cyber and International Law in the 21st
Century (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-internationallaw-in-the-21st-century [hereinafter U.K. Cyber Statement].
289. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 HARV. INT’ L
L.J. 1 (2012); Ney Remarks, supra note 261; Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State,
Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace at Berkeley Law School (Nov.
10, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm; DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 823–26 (Carrie Lyn D. Guymon ed., 2016)
(referencing the U.S. Submission report to the 2016-17 Group of Governmental Experts on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications); 2014 U.S. PRACTICE
DIGEST, supra note 262, at 732 (referencing the U.S. Submission report to the 2014-15
Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications); Koh, supra note 256, at 597.
290. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug.
21, 2007, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/.
291. Both authors of this Article were members of the group of experts on the 2013 and
2017 Tallinn Manuals. See Sean D. Carberry, Tallinn 2.0 Refines the Law of Cyberattacks,
FED. COMPUT. WK. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://fcw.com/articles/2017/02/09/tallinn-revise-cyberattacks.aspx?m=1.
292. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
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Applicable to Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0).293 Though merely
the personal views of the respective groups of experts, both manuals (and
particularly Tallinn Manual 2.0) benefitted from States’ and peer reviewers’
comments prior to publication. 294 While in no sense sources of international
law themselves, the manuals offer helpful baselines for States to consider
the applicability of international law to cyber operations.
In this vein, the work of Tallinn Manual 2.0 tracks the work by States at
the GGE in many respects. Much like the UN GGE Groups, the Tallinn
group had little difficulty agreeing that general international law, including
both its guiding principles and rules of conduct, applied, if only by default,
to States’ activities in cyberspace.295 As ever, the devil proved to be in the
details. That is, precisely how the principles of rules of general international
law would operate (so-called mixed questions of fact and law) and the
extent to which any cyber-specific rules of conduct or understandings had
developed repeatedly split the group into majority, minority factions and
even further into isolated views of single members. Far from a failing of the
group, this fragmentation merely reflected the simultaneous ambiguity
attendant to many of the principles considered and the nascent condition of
State practice in cyberspace. As much as anything, the manuals’
equivocations and fragmentation highlight opportunities for States to
develop firmer notions of how, if at all, international law baselines should
adjust in their application and operation in cyberspace.
Despite the inability of the UN GGE and private commentators to
produce a consensus statement with respect to operation of international
law in all its aspects to cyber activities, the significant weight of evidence
lies in favor of its application. Most States and commentators, both when
acting alone and when acting with others, have accepted this view. It is also
the predominant view among scholars and scholarly organizations. The
question to be discussed below is how the specific international law
principle of due diligence applies to cyber activities.
C. Due Diligence in Cyberspace
Recalling that the principle of due diligence requires States to not
knowingly allow their territory be a source of transboundary harm, cyber
activities over the past two decades have clearly implicated the principle of
293. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0].
294. See id. at 6.
295. See id. at 3–4.
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due diligence.296 Having situated the principle of due diligence in
international law and then reviewed the acceptance of international law as
governing cyber operations, it is now important to analyze the international
law principle of due diligence as applied to cyber operations. In light of the
firm and broadly accepted historical roots of due diligence by States, courts,
and commentators, along with the growing consensus that due diligence has
expanded to include context or regime-specific nuances, 297 the time is ripe
to survey States’ and others’ views with respect to international cyber due
diligence. Already, present perspectives include a menu of views. At one
end of the spectrum, some are enthusiastic toward broadminded
development of cyber-specific notions of due diligence. At the other end are
skeptical or regressive approaches, which either reject cyber-specific
applications or even advocate rollbacks of baseline due diligence as general
international law. As ever, primacy belongs to the views of States in this
respect.
In 2015, the last report of the UN GGE adopted “recommendations for
consideration by States for voluntary, non-binding norms, rules or
principles of responsible behaviour of States aimed at promoting an open,
secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.”298 Among those
“voluntary, non-binding” recommendations was the observation that “States
should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally
wrongful acts using ICTs.”299 However, failure to secure consensus on the
application of due diligence to cyber operations in 2017 seems less
catastrophic given the other basic failures of agreement on other seemingly
less controversial topics. Further, one might argue that the appearance of
cyber due diligence in the 2015 Report at all—even as a recommendation
for consideration—is still an acknowledgment that it is a point of discussion
among States. It is, as yet, unclear whether the 2019 UN GGE will produce
a consensus document and if such a document will include a statement on
due diligence.
The European Council (EC), through Josep Borrell, has also recently
published a statement with respect to cyber due diligence and “malicious
cyber activities exploiting the coronavirus pandemic.” 300 In the statement,
296. See supra Section III.A.
297. See supra Section III.A.
298. 2015 UN GGE Report, supra note 267, ¶ 13.
299. Id. ¶ 13(c).
300. Press Release, Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union,
Declaration on Malicious Cyber Activities Exploiting the Coronavirus Pandemic (Apr. 30,
2020), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/30/declaration-by-
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the “European Union and its Member States call upon every country to
exercise due diligence and take appropriate actions against actors
conducting such activities from its territory, consistent with international
law and the 2010, 2013 and 2015 consensus reports of the United Nations
Groups of Governmental Experts.”301 The endorsement of cyber due
diligence as a justification for “tak[ing] appropriate actions against actors
conducting [malicious] activities” from within a State’s territory by the
members of the European Council is a strong statement with respect to its
perceived legitimacy.302
Meanwhile, a limited number of States has addressed cyber due diligence
directly, providing additional clarity the UN GGE was unable to secure.
Many of these statements were offered in response to inquiries posed by
Professor Hollis under the auspices of the Organization of American States
(OAS). 303 For example, in response to the question, “Does due diligence
qualify as a rule of international law that States must follow in exercising
sovereignty over the information and communication technologies in their
territory or under the control of their nationals?,” Chile, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Guyana, and Peru each agreed due diligence applied to cyber
operations.304 According to Professor Hollis, “Bolivia offered a more
equivocal response,” arguing “a State may not be held responsible for a
cyber-attack when it lacks technological infrastructure to control a nonState actor.”305
By contrast, the United States did not respond to the question, leading
Professor Hollis to argue that “prior public U.S. statements have not
addressed the international legal status of due diligence directly. It is
notable, however, that the United States has tended to describe any
obligations to respond to requests for assistance in non-binding terms.” 306
Professor Hollis then concluded, “The lack of any public U.S. endorsement
of due diligence as a legal rule in either the GGE context or elsewhere may
be indicative of U.S. doubts as to its legal status.”307

the-high-representative-josep-borrell-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-malicious-cyberactivities-exploiting-the-coronavirus-pandemic/.
301. Id.
302. See id.
303. See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 22.
304. Id. at 19–20.
305. Id. at 21.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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States have offered comments outside the UN GGE, the EC, and the
OAS. Estonia, for example, has argued that States must assume a certain
level of responsibility:
[S]tates have to make reasonable efforts to ensure that their
territory is not used to adversely affect the rights of other states.
They should strive to develop means to offer support when
requested by the injured state in order to identify, attribute or
investigate malicious cyber operations. This expectation depends
on national capacity as well as availability, and accessibility of
information. 308
France argued for a strong view of due diligence, positing:
Under the due diligence obligation, States should ensure that
their sovereign domain in cyberspace is not used to commit
internationally unlawful acts. A State’s failure to comply with
this obligation is not a ground for an exception to the prohibition
of the use of force, contrary to the opinion of the majority of the
Tallinn Manual Group of Experts.309
The Netherlands, while acknowledging “not all countries agree that the due
diligence principle constitutes an obligation in its own right under
international law,”310 expressed the view that
the due diligence principle requires that states take action in
respect of cyber activities:
-

carried out by persons in their territory or where use is
made of items or networks that are in their territory or
which they otherwise control;

-

that violate a right of another state; and

-

whose existence they are, or should be, aware of. 311

On the other hand, despite allegations that non-state actors—as well as
coordinated transnational cyber actors such as Anonymous 312—have
engaged in major cyber operations from within States such as the United
308. Estonia Cyber Statement, supra note 282.
309. France Cyber Statement, supra note 283, at 10.
310. Netherlands Cyber Statement, supra note 286, app. at 4.
311. Id.
312. See Katie Bo Williams, Anonymous Declares War on ISIS, HILL (Nov. 16, 2015,
9:39 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/260245-anonymous-declares-war-on-isis.
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States,313 Russia,314 China,315 Israel, 316 Syria,317 and North Korea, 318 none of
these governments has clearly indicated a responsibility to exercise due
diligence in order to prevent transboundary cyber harm originating from
within its territory outside the UN GGE Reports. And no State has claimed
that a host State violates its “cyber due diligence” obligation by failing to
prevent such transboundary harm. 319
Thus, Professor Hollis was unable to find general acceptance of a cyber
due diligence principle. He instead concluded “there are competing views
on whether due diligence is a requirement of international law in
cyberspace.”320 As yet, there is apparently no consensus on how the due
diligence principle will apply in the sector-specific area of cyber operations,
at least according to select States. Others take different views.
The Tallinn group, for example, carefully considered the principle of due
diligence and its application to cyber operations. The group acknowledged
the UN GGE was unable to accept a rule applying due diligence to cyber
operations but emphasized the participating States “do not definitively
refute the existence of such a principle.” 321 The Tallinn group noted, “the
due diligence principle has long been reflected in jurisprudence [and] it is a
313. Iran Hit by Global Cyber Attack that Left U.S. Flag on Screens, REUTERS (Apr. 7,
2018, 12:15 PM EST), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-cyber-hackers/iran-hit-byglobal-cyber-attack-that-left-u-s-flag-on-screens-idUSKBN1HE0MH.
314. For a discussion of the cyber-attacks on Estonia and its defensive response, see
Kertu Ruus, Cyber War I: Estonia Attacked from Russia, EUR. INST., https://www.european
institute.org/index.php/archive/sort-by-date-2/42-winterspring-2008/67-cyber-war-i-estoniaattacked-from-russia (last visited Apr. 26, 2021).
315. Arjun Kharpal, Is China Still Hacking US? This Cyber Firm Says Yes, CNBC (Oct.
19, 2015, 6:40 AM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/19/china-hacking-us-companiesfor-secrets-despite-cyber-pact-.html.
316. Alex Hern & Peter Beaumont, Israel Hack Uncovered Russian Spies’ Use of
Kaspersky in 2015, Report Says, GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:05 AM EDT), https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/11/israel-hack-uncovered-russian-spies-usekaspersky-lab-2015-report-us-software-federal-government.
317. See Heather Kelly, Syrian Group Cited as New York Times Outage Continues, CNN
(Aug. 29, 2013), https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/27/tech/web/new-york-times-websiteattack/index.html (discussing the attack that temporarily shut down the New York Times
website).
318. Gordon Corera, NHS Cyber-Attack Was “Launched from North Korea”, BBC NEWS
(June 16, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40297493.
319. ERIC TALBOT JENSEN & SEAN WATTS, HOOVER INST., DUE DILIGENCE AND THE US
DEFEND FORWARD CYBER STRATEGY 1–2 (2020), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/
research/docs/jensen_and_watts_webready.pdf.
320. Hollis, supra note 3, at 20.
321. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 293, at 31, para. 3.
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general principle that has been particularised in specialised regimes of
international law.”322 Accordingly, the group confirmed two observations
concerning due diligence. First the group agreed, “A State must exercise
due diligence in not allowing its territory or cyber infrastructure under its
governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights
of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, other States.” 323
Commentary to this first observation clarified an “obligation of vigilance”
rather than an “obligation of prevention.”324 Despite historical evidence to
the contrary—including advocacy by States and findings of international
tribunals such as in the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations—the group
discerned no duty to take preventive measures. The group stated that “this
Rule is not to be interpreted as including a requirement of monitoring or
taking other steps designed to alert authorities to misuse of cyber
infrastructure located on the State’s territory.” 325
Second, the Tallinn group concluded the duty of due diligence as applied
to a cyber context operates only with respect to “serious adverse
consequences.”326 Though the exact meaning of that phrase is admittedly
unsettled in international law, the group resisted calls to clarify the term
beyond its present state.327 The group also acknowledged that the situation
of a transit State—a State through which harm transited but did not
originate—deserved specific analysis and provided additional commentary
with respect to the situation.328
Finally, the group discerned, “[k]nowledge is a constitutive element in
the application” of due diligence to cyber operations. 329 The group
identified no State practice supporting any alteration from the baseline
principle of due diligence with respect to the cyber context and knowledge.
The group concluded, as the Court in Corfu Channel had, that requisite
knowledge could be actual or constructive. 330 In other words, for a State to
have a due diligence obligation, it must have knowledge of the
transboundary harm emanating from within its territory or from cyber
infrastructure which the governmental controls.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 31, para. 4.
Id. at 30, r. 6.
Id. at 31–32, para. 5; see also id. at 43, r. 7.
Id. at 42, para. 42.
See id. at 43, r. 7.
See id. at 34, para. 15; id. at 36–39, paras. 25–32.
See id. at 33, para. 13.
Id. at 40, para. 37.
Id. at 40–41, paras. 37–39.
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The group achieved consensus with respect to still another limit on the
due diligence principle in cyber operations. The group agreed, “The
principle of due diligence requires a State to take all measures that are
feasible in the circumstances to put an end to cyber operations that affect a
right of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, other States.” 331 In
interpreting this rule, “[t]he Experts agreed that the territorial State must act
to terminate the wrongful operation, but that it is at that State’s discretion to
choose the means to comply with this Rule.” 332
All told, while the Tallinn group achieved consensus on an international
law obligation of cyber due diligence, it recognized a more limited duty
than that which has arguably developed in other sectors, such as
international environmental law. The lack of a duty to prevent or even
monitor, coupled with high threshold of harm and absolute requirement of
knowledge, suggests a minimally intrusive notion of due diligence
applicable to cyberspace.
In addition to those States and collective private efforts convened by
organizations mentioned above, individual commentators have variously
advocated for the application of due diligence to cyber operations, while
acknowledging States’ seeming skepticism of such an application.
Professor Schmitt, who led both Tallinn manual projects, wrote
separately in support of due diligence during his work on Tallinn Manual
2.0. He identified a pressing dilemma States face with respect to the due
diligence principle between “the burden they fear the principle may
impose” and their desire to “ensure that other states take every feasible step
to put an end to harmful cyber activities launched from—or through—their
own territory.”333 He argued due diligence is a “general principle” of
international law, meaning that “the presumption is that the principle
applies unless state practice or opinio juris excludes it.”334 Professor
Schmitt posited that, if applied correctly, States need not worry about due
diligence overreach.335 Rather, he argued, “the obligation is highly sensitive
to the capabilities of the states concerned,” thus relieving the expectation of
an onerous application.336 Further, the application of due diligence is
bounded by what is reasonable under the circumstances, meaning that “if
331. Id. at 43, r. 7.
332. Id. at 44, para. 6.
333. Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J. F.
68, 69 (2015).
334. Id. at 73.
335. Id. at 74–75.
336. Id. at 75.
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the burden on the territorial state in taking remedial actions is so onerous as
to be unreasonable under the circumstances, inaction will not constitute a
breach.”337 Professor Schmitt also echoed the Tallinn Manual 2.0
conclusion that due diligence applies only with respect to “ongoing cyber
activities that are generating serious adverse effects in another country,”
and when the State has knowledge of the actions. 338 In summary, Professor
Schmitt argued that the “right of sovereignty and the corresponding duty of
due diligence must be in equilibrium.”339 Recognizing this equilibrium,
Schmitt concludes that:
A state need not undertake onerous measures to prevent its cyber
infrastructure from being used maliciously, such as monitoring
all cyber activity. And only when a state learns of ongoing
activities—such as when the victim state brings it to light—does
the duty mature. Most importantly, the principle of sovereign
equality means that other states bear the same obligation. Thus,
they have a legal incentive to ensure that harmful cyber
operations are not conducted from their territories. If they fail to
comply with their due diligence responsibility, the injured state
may respond either directly against them or indirectly by
conducting operations against the non-state actors involved. 340
Where Professor Schmitt offers a limited notion of due diligence,
Professors Shackelford, Russell, and Kuehn depart and advocate “a
proactive regime that takes into account the common but differentiated
responsibilities of various stakeholders in cyberspace.” 341 They translate
due diligence requirements into specific State responsibilities, comparing
the American, German, and Chinese “domestic policy regimes including
laws, frameworks, . . . and initiatives that incentivize private actors under
their jurisdiction to behave in accordance with prevailing legal
obligations.”342 The authors divide their analysis “into three general activity
categories: (1) Establish and Maintain, (2) Control and Enforce, and (3)

337. Id.
338. Id. at 75–76.
339. Id. at 80.
340. Id.
341. Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International
Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2016).
342. Id. at 34–35.
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Monitor and Assess.”343 They then rate each country on their success in
these areas.344 Ultimately, the authors attempt “to provide illustrative
examples of various domestic responsibilities and approaches to meeting
them in the due diligence context.”345
The authors then examine how those domestic regulations translate into
the private sector in the United States, with respect to encouraging private
sector cybersecurity due diligence. They conclude, “Despite some progress,
there is still a long way to go.” 346 A proposed solution is their “polycentric
approach,” which “recognizes that diverse organizations working at
multiple levels can create different types of policies that can increase levels
of cooperation and compliance, enhancing ‘flexibility across issues and
adaptability over time.’”347 Application of due diligence in this polycentric
approach, they argue, will allow the international community to “mitigate
the risk of cyber war by laying the groundwork for a positive cyber peace
that respects human rights, spreads Internet access along with best
practices, and strengthens governance mechanisms by fostering multistakeholder collaboration.”348
343. Id. at 35.
344. See id. at 37–41.
345. Id. at 41–42.
346. Id. at 44.
347. Id. at 46 (quoting Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for
Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 15 (2011)).
348. Id. at 48–49. See generally Oliver Dörr, Obligations of the State of Origin of a
Cyber Security Incident, 58 GERMAN Y.B. INT’ L L. 87, 87 (2015) (“[T]he obligation to
prevent [transboundary] harm is a general obligation of due diligence and, as such, provides
a flexible regulatory framework to define substantive and procedural duties of conduct and
to accommodate the public and private interests involved.”); Matthias Herdegen, Possible
Legal Framework and Regulatory Models for Cyberspace: Due Diligence Obligations and
Institutional Models for Enhanced Inter-State Cooperation, 58 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 169,
184 (2015) (“States must apply due diligences in supervising threats to cyber-security which
may affect other States and prevent substantial harm by transboundary activities.”); Matthias
C. Kettemann, Ensuring Cybersecurity Through International Law, 69 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 281, 288 (2017) (discussing the role of non-governmental
stakeholders in effectively applying the principle of due diligence to cyber operations);
Robert Kolb, Reflections on Due Diligence Duties and Cyberspace, 58 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L
L. 113, 127 (2015) (raising several questions about the application of due diligence to cyber
activities but concluding nonetheless that “[d]ue diligence is a concept flexible enough to
accommodate such particular needs”); Joanna Kulesza, State Responsibility for CyberAttacks on International Peace and Security, 29 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 139, 151 (2009)
(“[T]here is a need for an international consensus on the criteria which have to be fulfilled
by a state in order to avoid international responsibility for failing to show due diligence in
protecting other sovereigns from cyber-attacks.”); Ian Yuying Liu, State Responsibility and
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While Professor Schmitt clearly, and understandably, advocated the
Tallinn Manual 2.0 approach to due diligence, a critique of this approach
alleged several flaws in the analysis. 349 The critique accepted “[d]ue
diligence is customary international law,” 350 but argued the Tallinn group
should have accepted a “theory of aggregation when determining the
character of the triggering harm fails to cover Botnet operations.” 351 The
critique argued the nature of botnet operations, in particular, would rarely
reach the threshold of harm required by the due diligence principle, leaving
the victim State without a claim and the generating State without an
obligation.352 The critique also claimed the Tallinn Manual 2.0 rejection of
preventative measures with respect to the exercise of due diligence allows
States to “implement[] a policy of plausible deniability when it comes to
cyber operations in their territory.” 353 The critique predicted States would
adopt the theory of aggregation of attacks and take an obligation to
preventatively gather knowledge about cyber activities in a State’s
territory. 354 This knowledge would then permit the due diligence principle
to become “an indispensable tool in maintaining international peace and
security” with respect to cyber operations. 355
Alongside support for cyber due diligence as an international legal
approach to transboundary cyber harms, there is limited skepticism
concerning State acceptance of the duty of due diligence and its application
to cyber activities by States. For example, Professor Schmitt himself
acknowledges “nascent state opposition” to the application of a general rule
of cyber due diligence.356 Similarly, Professor Hollis argues that “[t]he lack
of any public U.S. endorsement of due diligence as a legal rule in either the
GGE context or elsewhere may be indicative of U.S. doubts as to its legal
Cyberattacks: Defining Due Diligence Obligations, 4 INDONESIAN J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.
191, 193 (2017) (“A due diligence obligation in cyberspace (‘cyberdiligence’), if
established, would offer victim States alternative legal recourse for a territorial State's breach
of a primary obligation.”).
349. See Colin Patrick, Comment, Debugging the Tallinn Manual 2.0’s Application of
the Due Diligence Principle to Cyber Operations, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 581 (2019).
350. Id. at 583.
351. Id. at 596. A Botnet operation occurs when a “malicious party takes control of
Internet of Things (IoT) devices” then uses them to “launch large-scale Distributed Denial of
Service (DDos) attacks.” Id.
352. Id. at 597–98.
353. Id. at 600.
354. See id. at 600–01.
355. Id. at 603.
356. Schmitt, supra note 333, at 69.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/3

2021]

CYBER DUE DILIGENCE

701

status.”357 Others have also used caution with respect to various
applications of cyber due diligence. Professors Reinisch and Beham
conclude, “the obligations of transit States remain largely unclear.”358
Finally, in a previous work, we raised a warning concerning the potential
unanticipated consequences of a strong due diligence obligation that may
lead to failures equating to a violation of international law, allowing a resort
to countermeasures as a remedy. We observed previously,
[B]y presenting more opportunities for more States to allege
more breaches of international law, due diligence potentially
increases the frequency of States’ resort to countermeasures and
their accompanying potentially destabilizing effects. Before fully
embracing a more refined notion of cyber due diligence and the
consequent increased opportunities to allege breach, States are
well advised to consider carefully both practical limitations of
the international regime of self-help and associated costs to
international stability.359
In summary, it appears there is widespread acceptance of due diligence
as a fundamental principle that may facilitate the resolution of emerging
issues, such as harmful transboundary cyber activities. The advocacy and
outcomes of the U.S. claims in Alabama and Trail Smelter suggest a
diplomatic custom of support as well. More recently, the ICJ has
unabashedly issued decisions based on the specific application of a general
due diligence principle, while the International Law Commission and
International Law Association have both produced documents which also
endorse such a position.
While much of the stronger language has reflected the sector specific
area of international environmental law, these works and statements by
States have confirmed in broad terms States’ general duty to cease harm
that emanates from their territory. However, the sector specific application
of due diligence to cyber activities is less clear. The inability of the UN
GGE to make a strong statement in this area continues to feed skepticism
sufficient to overcome the embrace of the principle by a majority of
academics. Statements such as the recent EC statement will continue to
357. HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 21.
358. August Reinisch & Markus Beham, Mitigating Risks: Inter-State Due Diligence
Obligations in Case of Harmful Cyber Incidents and Malicious Cyber Activity – Obligations
of the Transit State, 58 GERMAN Y.B. INT’ L L. 101, 111 (2015).
359. Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, A Cyber Duty of Due Diligence: Gentle Civilizer
or Crude Destabilizer?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1577 (2017).
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increase the pressure on States, including the United States, to accept the
notion of cyber due diligence.
IV. Potential Future Perspectives
Review of past and present perspectives suggests due diligence has lived
two distinct, though interconnected lives in international law. First, it is
abundantly clear due diligence has been a widely recognized and applied
principle of international law since the late nineteenth century or earlier. 360
In the absence of a fully developed regime of tort, as found in municipal
systems of law, States have resorted to due diligence to express general
expectations of reasonable care and regard for harms to sovereignty
between States.361 More than an abstract norm or guiding sentiment, the
principle of due diligence has enjoyed doctrinal acknowledgement from
tribunals, publicists, and States. 362 Indeed, due diligence is viewed as a
general, though ambiguously framed, duty to cease harm that emanates
from sovereign territory and causes serious adverse consequences in the
territory of another State.363 The precise standards of conduct and result that
follow from the principle and its doctrine remain unclear. But at a
minimum, responsibility for serious harm from activity in a State’s territory
has formed an important baseline to regulate relations between States
generally. 364
Second, the same sources have simultaneously acknowledged and have
gradually refined regime-specific notions of due diligence that operate as or
supplement rules of conduct. Early periods featured obligations of due
diligence by States specific to neutrality and to maritime affairs. 365 Later,
other specific fields and conditions of international relations including
armed conflict, the natural environment, outer space, human rights, and
perhaps now global health have developed or are developing an
increasingly refined doctrinal conceptions of due diligence through treaty,
custom, and, in a subsidiary sense, through decisions of tribunals. 366 Many
specialized international regimes now include detailed standards of conduct
or results, thresholds of harm, and obligations of reparation as matters of
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due diligence. 367 As the preceding Part illustrated, these regime-specific
notions of due diligence feature extensively in treaties, international
litigation, and private sector work on international law and point to the
likely path of development of due diligence in emerging domains of
international relations.
Third, although distinct in important doctrinal respects, the two lives of
due diligence have been interrelated. Each has clearly influenced or
inspired developments and refinements in the other. Acknowledgement and
development of the principle of due diligence has inspired or spawned
regime-specific notions of due diligence. In nearly every context of
international relations, States and tribunals have resorted to the principle of
due diligence as a baseline or starting point to discern or develop further
rules of conduct and result arising from State failures with respect to a wide
range of harm.368 Likewise, regime-specific doctrines have influenced or
purport to influence the doctrinal content of the principle of due
diligence.369 The quite detailed standards of conduct or result, thresholds of
harm, and reparation schemes developed for specific domains of
international relations have been proposed for incorporation into the general
scheme of international due diligence with varying degrees of success. 370
Thus, it is clear due diligence in each incarnation, and through the
interaction of these incarnations, plays an increasingly important role in the
international legal regulation of State interactions. In light of these two
lives, their future importance, and in recognition of positive history with
due diligence broadly, the United States may wish to revisit its position on
both due diligence and cyber due diligence. At the very least, the United
States should consider embracing a neutral view on both applications, but
more positively embracing a tailored approach to both due diligence and
cyber due diligence.
As the previous Part illustrated, it is difficult to identify a current U.S.
view on the principle of due diligence. Present U.S. practice generally
avoids the question of due diligence altogether or frames comments on due
diligence as reflections on desirable norms of State behavior rather than
reflections on a legally binding duty. 371 To date, the most unequivocal U.S.
statements on the principle are found in submissions to late nineteenth and
mid-twentieth century international arbitrations in which the United States
367.
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was a victim State.372 The extent to which these statements curtail or should
curtail a future U.S. position deserves consideration.
As a preliminary matter, U.S. legal policymakers may wish to refine and
express U.S. views on the status of due diligence as a principle of
international law. Historical U.S. legal statements could guide the limits of
a plausible and coherent U.S. future perspective on due diligence. At a
minimum, the United States might publicly acknowledge its customary
support for due diligence in its foreign relations and diplomatic practices.
Additionally, favorable outcomes and practical diplomatic concerns seem to
counsel in favor of maintaining a status quo U.S. approach to due diligence.
Still, substantial doctrinal flexibility remains for U.S. legal policy to
account for extant and anticipated demands of international relations. A
U.S. statement on a principle of due diligence might admit its existence but
simultaneously identify and advocate limits on doctrinal details, including a
duty to prevent harm and on the threshold of harm itself.
It is worth recalling the United States zealously embraced and advocated
a general duty of diligence between States as a principle of international
law at the Treaty of Washington negotiations with Great Britain, and in two
legal episodes that preceded those negotiations. 373 Recall, the United States
aggressively advocated for and largely succeeded at codifying the principle
of due diligence into the Treaty of Washington as both an ad hoc rule of
adjudication and as a prospective limit on future relations with Great
Britain and potentially with other States. 374 Then, at all stages of the
Alabama arbitration that followed—and in the face of British backpedaling
on the principle—the United States maintained steadfast support for a
general duty of due diligence between States. 375 As related above, the
Alabama tribunal clearly adopted the U.S. view to the substantial benefit of
the United States and ultimately to its relations with Great Britain.
More than sixty years later and on the eve of its emergence as a
superpower, through a decades-long series of diplomatic negotiations and a
protracted international legal arbitration with Canada, the United States
similarly endorsed and advocated a general duty of due diligence in
international law. From 1927 through 1941, the Trail Smelter episode
provoked clear and unwavering U.S. assertions of a duty of diligence for
Canada to cease emanation of privately generated transboundary harm as a
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matter of international law. 376 And like its predecessor, the Alabama
tribunal, the Trail Smelter tribunal largely adopted U.S. arguments, again,
to the substantial benefit of U.S. interests and, ultimately, to U.S.-Canada
relations.
Some commentators have cabined the Trail Smelter opinion’s legal
outputs and precedential value, particularly its observations concerning due
diligence, to the context of transboundary environmental pollution. It is
true, at the time of Trail Smelter arbitration, litigation of transnational
environmental harm was novel to international law. Yet a more adept
reading of the Trail Smelter decision and of the involved States’
submissions to the tribunal restricts allegations of legal innovation to the
arbitration’s and the parties’ application of due diligence rather than to the
existence of a duty of due diligence. On the mixed question of fact and law
regarding whether States owed a duty to cease environmental pollution by
private parties’ operations within their territory, the tribunal and parties’
filings may have broken new ground. However, any regime-specific
doctrines of due diligence that emerged from the Trail Smelter tribunal’s
decision and the parties’ submissions surely reflect, in substantial part,
application of the preexisting and general duty of due diligence offered by
the United States at each stage of negotiation and arbitration and embraced
by the tribunal—and for that matter by Canada—as a baseline principle of
international law.
As Professor Hollis has indicated, more recent U.S. perspectives on due
diligence present a less clear case for a future perspective. 377 But, on
balance, U.S. practice seems to support recognition of due diligence as a
principle of international law. In the face of consistent and repeated
expressions of the principle in high-profile litigation at the ICJ, the United
States has expressed no public or notorious objection to due diligence
conceived broadly. From its very general confirmation of U.K. due
diligence claims in the Corfu Channel case through its direct and
unequivocal confirmation and application of the principle to modern
contexts of State interaction, the ICJ has served up a consistent and
progressively refined vision of the principle of due diligence to the
international community. The United States has not expressed publicly any
of the sort of criticism or censure of the Court that might be expected if due
diligence were not in its view a principle of general international law.

376. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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Admittedly, judgments, even grossly incorrect ones, or statements of law
by international tribunals do not require State rejoinders. And despite treaty
provisions suggesting the contrary, there is strong evidence, also based in
treaty, for a purely adjudicative rather than law-making understanding of
international litigation.378 Yet, such persistent and prominent judicial
confirmation of the principle of due diligence, such as those offered by ad
hoc and standing tribunals, would seem to have provoked some adverse
U.S. reaction if in fact the United States regarded them as made in error.
Moreover, these tribunals’ judgments align closely with positions taken by
the United States in its litigation over due diligence claims. These positions
thus render the conclusion the United States has generally, though quietly,
since the 1940s supported due diligence at least reasonable. Thus, although
not entirely untenable, a U.S. legal position rejecting due diligence as a
principle of international law would be extraordinarily difficult to peddle at
this late stage of development.
Beyond past or present U.S. legal positions, other practical
considerations derived from U.S. experience with the principle of due
diligence bear mention in the formation of a future U.S. perspective. First,
on two legally historic occasions, embrace and assertion of due diligence
served the United States extraordinarily well in its international relations.
The Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations not only secured meaningful
compensation from other States for harm to U.S. citizens, both episodes
ended with significant vindications of U.S. foreign policy. 379 The United
States emerged from each episode as a State unwilling to compromise its
citizens’ interests yet committed to peaceful and independent evaluation of
its claims. 380 Further, each episode played a significant part in securing a
peaceful and prosperous future relationship with an important ally.
In a related sense, both the Alabama and Trail Smelter results illustrate
the role due diligence might play as a relief valve of sorts in international
relations. The Alabama claims arose in the highly charged context of
recognition of belligerency by Great Britain. Paired with this diplomatic
and international legal insult, the harm resulting from British-built ships to
U.S. merchant fleets nearly brought the parties to war.381
378. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055 (identifying judicial decisions as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
[international] law”). But see id. art. 59 (stating a “decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”).
379. See discussion supra Sections II.A–B.
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381. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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As related above, broader political and economic considerations perhaps
best explain how the United States and Great Britain avoided war. Yet the
nature of the due diligence principle as an internationally wrongful act may
also have played a part in the peaceful and successful resolution of the
Alabama claims. That is, casting British conduct as a failure of due
diligence permitted the United States to raise the issue early, in a way,
freezing the facts of the dispute and reducing the likelihood of escalatory
exchanges of retorsions or even reprisals.
Similarly, although damage from the Trail Smelter significantly soured
U.S-Canada relations for more than a decade, the U.S. claims alleged a
lapse of diligence. 382 Arguably, it was an omission—rather than direct
responsibility for or an affirmative act resulting in harm—which explains
their successful and peaceful resolution. Again, the nature of the due
diligence principle as an allegation of omission rather than of action or even
of imputed responsibility may have played a part in the peaceful and
successful resolution of the claims.
Although developed as a facet of international legal responsibility
between States, due diligence is peculiar in that it does not require that the
harm involved be traced directly to or attributed to the offending State. Nor,
for that matter, does due diligence operate as a theory of liability requiring a
predicate or underlying international wrong; the lapse of diligence is itself a
wrongful act.
A breach of due diligence simply involves a failure on the part of the
offending State to act reasonably to cease harm regardless of attribution and
regardless of the wrongfulness of acts that caused harm. Fault and
recompense in due diligence are not based on highly nefarious attributions
or commissions of underlying internationally wrongful acts in every case as
with other international causes of action. Rather they are based on mere
omission or even oversight by the offending State. 383
In this sense, breaches of due diligence may reflect comparatively less
damning or threatening delicts than other allegations in international law.
Allegations grounded in due diligence permit both victim and offending
States to address and resolve claims arising from harm somewhat indirectly.
The victim State is able to assert and protect its interests against a peer
international legal personality, while the offending State is able either to
deny or at least elude direct responsibility for the harm, perhaps to save face

382. See discussion supra Section II.B.
383. See discussion supra Part II, Sections III.A–B.
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or satisfy domestic interests, while offering a de-escalatory concession of
omission to the victim State.
Although the apparently magnanimous concessions of both Great Britain
and Canada respectively in the Alabama and Trail Smelter episodes have
been explained by larger political and economic conditions, the
comparatively benign brand of culpability associated with due diligence
surely made magnanimity in these episodes all the more feasible than more
direct or damning allegations of fault might have. These de-escalatory or
face-saving experiences, associated at least in part with due diligence,
might further counsel the United States not abandon support for the
principle as a relief valve of this sort in international relations.
Finally, if U.S. rejection of a principle of due diligence generally would
be difficult, the United States might nonetheless tend to misgivings over
evolving expressions of the principle through an updated expression on the
subject. As noted previously, although legally distinct, the international law
principle of due diligence and various regime-specific expressions of due
diligence have experienced a developmental cross pollination of sorts. 384
Clearly the principle of due diligence has inspired and informed regimespecific notions of the concept. Meanwhile, doctrinal elaborations
originally developed for specific contexts of international interaction have
found their way into academic, and even judicial, descriptions of the
principle of due diligence. For instance, although the regime-specific notion
of prevention of harm presents most clearly in international environmental
law, it has featured in a number of prominent articulations of the general
principle of due diligence. That is, accounts of the due diligence principle
recite a general—as opposed to a merely regime-specific—duty on the part
of States to prevent, rather than merely respond to and cease, transboundary
harm. To preserve the traditional flexibility and adaptability of the principle
of due diligence, the United States might reject refinements such as a duty
of prevention or a lower threshold of harm reserving such questions for
regime-specific incarnations of the principle.
Given the two lives of due diligence discussed above, the U.S.
determination on how to treat due diligence in the future is not necessarily
dispositive of how it will treat cyber due diligence. While it would be
legally inconsistent to reject a general principle of due diligence and
embrace cyber due diligence, the same is not true if the United States
decides to accept the general principle and reject the sector-specific
application. It is not certain the United States will embrace cyber due
384. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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diligence as a matter of international law. The recent Cyber Solarium
Report presented an opportunity to endorse due diligence as one method of
placing legal responsibility upon violators who are attacking U.S. interests
both at home and abroad but did not. 385
On the other hand, the U.S.’s historical advocacy of due diligence and
the general trends among the international community toward a sector
specific application of cyber due diligence should be sufficient to cause
serious reflection on the part of the United States of potential benefits from
endorsing such a view. In an age where harmful transboundary activities are
increasing at an alarming rate, cyber due diligence offers one legal
methodology to assign accountability and provide possible options for
redress.
Additionally, if the United States embraced a duty of cyber due
diligence, many of the potential concerns with overreach would be
minimized. Rejecting, as the Tallinn group did, the duty of prevention and
monitoring would remove potential human rights concerns as well as limit
the scope of the requirement to a much more plausible requirement.
Further, by reinforcing the requirement for actual or constructive
knowledge prior to the duty to take action and then limiting that action to
what is feasible, the United States and other like-minded States can endorse
a view of due diligence that provides a remedy to the increasing risks
associated with transboundary cyber harm without creating a duty that is
too onerous to apply or enforce. Such a tailored duty of cyber due diligence
deserves not only consideration, but adoption by the United States and,
indeed, the entire international community.
V. Conclusion
The idea that a State advocate and beneficiary of two of the earliest and
most prominent due diligence claims in international law would abandon
the principle involves no small irony. On two occasions in its international
legal history, the United States championed due diligence to its great
diplomatic advantage. Both episodes featured not only ardent U.S. resort to

385. ANGUS KING & MIKE GALLAGHER, U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT (Mar. 2020). This report was ordered by Congress in the 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act in order to “develop a consensus on a strategic approach to defending the
United States in cyberspace against cyber attacks of significant consequences.” John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
§ 1652, 132 Stat. 1636, 2141 (2018).
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international legal process and regulation but also illustrated the potential
for international law to contribute to peaceful resolution of disputes.
Greatly influenced by U.S. arguments and experience, a wide range of
international law sources, including States, courts, and publicists has
embraced two incarnations of due diligence. Due diligence clearly operates
as a free-standing, baseline duty of conduct by States to cease serious ham
that emanates from their territory. In the absence of more specific rules of
conduct, this general incarnation of due diligence reflects a minimum
standard of care in international relations. Separately, but similarly
influenced by early U.S. diplomatic practice, due diligence has developed
in sector-specific legal regimes as a rule of conduct and as a supplement to
understandings of other duties. Legal regimes including neutrality, law of
the sea, law of war, and, most notably of late, environmental law have
developed increasingly refined notions and doctrines of due diligence to
regulate State conduct in volatile domains of international relations. While
the United States played an active role in the early development of both
incarnations of due diligence, there are signs of U.S. reticence or even
recalcitrance with respect to due diligence generally and as applied to
emerging domains of such as cyberspace.
A survey of past U.S. experience, growing international support, as well
as the merits and limitations of due diligence itself, suggests the United
States should adopt an active and clear legal policy toward both
incarnations of due diligence. With respect to general or baseline due
diligence, the United States might express support while emphasizing the
doctrinal limits of international consensus. The United States might
embrace core elements including a duty to cease known and serious adverse
consequences while characterizing efforts to further refine duties of
prevention or to lower thresholds of harm as unsupported by custom and
practice. At the same time, the United States might clarify views on sectorspecific notions of due diligence, including cyberspace. A duty of due
diligence in cyberspace offers significant potential to mitigate harm to
critical information infrastructure. Yet the peculiar technical, economic, and
diplomatic features of cyberspace suggest clear and perhaps idiosyncratic
limits on how due diligence can and should operate in this unique realm. A
clearly defined U.S. legal policy toward due diligence, accounting for U.S.
diplomatic practice, intervening international legal developments, and the
peculiarities of cyberspace as a domain of state interaction and competition
will both support vital U.S. security interests and reassert influence on a
critical component of the regulation of modern international relations.
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